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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, 
LC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee / Respondent, 
v. 
CARLOS MARIN, 
Defendant / Appellant / Petitioner. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 20090875-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the 29 January 2010 Order granting the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Petitioner. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5); Utah 
R.App.P. 51. 
II. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Court granted review of a 24 September 2009 opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals affirming a 26 March 2008 Order of the Fourth District Court (Judge Samuel 
McVey) granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Respondent Young 
Living Essential Oils, LC (R. 451-462), and the trial court's 12 June 2008 Final Judgment 
in favor of Respondent Young Living awarding damages and attorney fees (R. 500-505, 
563-565). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Can the covenant of good faith and fair dealing be used to add new terms 
to an expressly integrated written agreement? Can the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing circumvent the parol evidence rule?1 This Court reviews questions of law 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994). This Court reviews the factual determination that an agreement is 
integrated under a clearly erroneous standard. Tangren Famly Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20 f 11, 182 P.3d 326, 329 (Utah 2008). 
2. Are attorney fees issues preserved for appeal where the losing party fails 
to timely object? "To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised 'a 
timely and specific objection' before the trial court. We will not address an issue if it is 
not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for seeking review." 
H.U.F. v. W.P.W. P.3d , 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) {quoting State v. Low, 
2008 UT 58, If 17, 19, 192 P.3d 867, 880 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (Copy at 
Addendum 1). 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 51(b)(4), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent believes this 
statement of the issues was presented or is "fairly included" in the petition for certiorari 
(Petition f 1 at 1), and in the issue ordered by the Court for review, to wit: "Whether the 
court of appeals erred in its assessment of Petitioner's argument that Respondent 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 
Pursuant to Rule 51(b)(4), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent believes this 
statement of the issue was presented or is "fairly included" in the petition for certiorari 
(Petition f^ 2 at 1), and in the issue ordered by the Court for review, to wit: "Whether the 
court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of attorney fees." 
2 
Assuming the issue has been preserved, "[t]he standard of review on appeal of [the 
amount of] a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion." Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R Group, Inc., 189 P.3d 114, f 12 at 118 
(Utah App. 2008) (citing Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, J^ 127, 130 P.2d 325, 328 (Utah 
2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 
1998)). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Summary Judgment - Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Chil Procedure: 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
Preservation - Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with 
an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, 
the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's 
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity 
with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be 
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order 
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 26 July 2006, Plaintiff/Respondent Young Living Essential Oils, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company ("Young Living"), filed its complaint against 
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Defendant/Petitioner Carlos Marin ("Marin"), for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
quantum meruit, fraud, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
negligent misrepresentation in the Fourth District Court. (R. 1-23). 
On 18 December 2006, Marin filed his Amended Answer. (R. 52-63). 
On 21 March 2007, Young Living filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(Breach of Contract Claim) (R. 74) with a supporting Memorandum and accompanying 
affidavits (R. 69-72, 75-105). On 4 April 2007, Marin filed his Response to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 110-
119), with a supporting affidavit (R. 120-127). On 13 August 2007, Young Living filed 
its Reply and Opposition to Defendant's Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(R. 130-170; see also Errata at R. 308-311), with supporting affidavits and declarations 
(R. 171-287). On 27 August 2007, Marin filed his Reply (R. 293-295). 
At a 1 October 2007 hearing on the motions, the trial court (Judge Samuel 
McVey) granted Young Living's motion for partial summary judgment on its contract 
claim and denied Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 312). On 26 
March 2008, the trial court signed the Order granting Young Living's motion for partial 
summary judgment and denying Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (R. 
451-462). 
On 27 May 2008, Young Living filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its remaining 
claims against Marin, filed its affidavit of attorney's fees and costs (R. 463-495), and 
submitted a proposed Final Judgment (R. 503-505). 
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On 11 June 2008, Marin filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Final Judgment 
and Fee Affidavit (R. 496-499). 
On 12 June 2008, the trial court entered the Order dismissing Young Living's 
remaining claims (R. 500-502) and entered its Final Judgment (R. 503-505). 
On 14 July 2008, Marin filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 513-514). 
On 24 September 2009, without hearing oral argument and in an unpublished 
memorandum decision (Addendum 2), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's judgment. Quoting this Court's opinion in Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, 
Inc., the court of appeals held that, '"[w]hile a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inheres in almost every contract, ... this covenant cannot be read to establish new, 
independent rights or duties.'" Since "no obligation regarding marketing tools was 
made a part of the written agreement," the court of appeals rejected "Marin's argument 
that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be used to incorporate 
extrinsic evidence of a contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties' [written] 
agreement was integrated."4 
The court of appeals also held that because Marin had failed to timely file an 
objection, he had not preserved the attorney fees issue for appeal.5 
3
 Addendum 2 at 3, quoting Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f^ 
45, 104 P.3d 1225, 1239 (Utah 2004). 
4Id 
5
 Id at 3-4. 
5 
On 26 October 2009, Marin filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On 29 January 
2010, this Court granted the petition. 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following undisputed facts are taken verbatim from the district court's 26 
March 2008 Order (R. 462-458) except that, pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, "Young Living" replaces "Plaintiff," and "Marin" replaces 
"Defendant" here. The "Facts" outlined in paragraphs 12-20 of Petitioner's brief (Pet. 
Br. at 6-9) were rejected by the trial court and court of appeals (and were contradicted by 
Young Living's submissions at the trial court - see R. 171-287). 
A. Valid Contract 
1. After negotiations, Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Young Living") 
a Utah corporation, ultimately executed a written agreement ("Agreement") with 
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Marin") on 12 January 2005. 
2. In their Agreement, Marin expressly represented and warranted that he had 
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader," had "numerous contacts with potential 
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors 
with the Company," and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services 
such as the duties as contemplated herein." 
3. Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the 
signature blocks, is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part: 
"there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in 
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein." 
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B. Young Living's Obligations 
4. Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Young Living agreed to pay Marin 
advance payments of 
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005); 
$25,000 on 15 February 2005; 
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and 
$25,000 on 15 April 2005. 
5. According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance 
bonuses were to help Marin devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting 
additional distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended 
"to entice [Marin] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it. 
Also, [they] will provide him with a quick resource of cash tp build the business." 
6. Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any 
payments due Marin for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses. 
7. Under paragraph 4.3, Young Living gave Marin a product credit of $5,000 for 
January 2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new 
Distributor/Leaders." 
C, Marin's Obligations 
8. Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Marin agreed to "devote his full time 
and attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Young Living's products. 
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9. Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Marin agreed that he would meet the 
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the 
specified dates: 
$5,000 by 15 February 2005; 
$30,000 by 15 March 2005; 
$100,000 by 15 April 2005; 
$300,000 by 15 May 2005; 
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and 
$900,000 by 15 July 2005. 
10. Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Marin's payment of Young 
Living's "loss and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention ... of any of the 
terms and conditions imposed on [Marin] pursuant to this Agreement." 
D. Young Living's Performance and Marin's Breach 
11. On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement, 
Young Living paid Marin a $25,000 advance. 
12. On 15 February 2005, Marin met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales 
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
13. Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Young Living paid Marin another 
$25,000 advance. 
14. On 15 March 2005, Marin had failed to meet his $30,000 cumulative "auto 
ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
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15. On 15 March 2005, Young Living paid Marin another $15,000 advance based 
on Marin's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 performance guarantee 
of $30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005. 
16. On 15 April 2005, Marin had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let 
alone his 15 April 2005 $100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance 
guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
17. Through June 2006, Marin had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in 
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume. 
E. Damages 
18. Young Living paid Marin $65,000.00 in advances. 
19. In 2005 and 2006, Marin earned a total of $3,^37.57 in commissions from 
Young Living. 
20. Marin never earned "Fast Cash55 bonus payments,. 
21. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the ^monies advanced to [Marin] 
will be offset by any payments due [Marin] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated 
below. Also, these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Marin] 
each month as calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . . If any of the 
advanced amounts are not repaid by the commission payoiits or Fast Cash at the end of 
the guaranteed payments, these amounts will be deducted from any future commission 
payout . . . ." 
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VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Summary judgment. This case involves an expressly integrated written 
agreement. Marin argues that, based on his affidavit submitted in response to Young 
Living's motion, his admitted failure to meet agreed-upon performance guarantees was 
excused because of Young Living's prior breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported deadline. As a 
result, Marin argues, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' opinion affirming the 
trial court's judgment in favor of Young Living on its breach of contract claim. 
Marin makes two supporting arguments: 
(1) He claims he is not attempting through his affidavit to impose new, 
independent duties into the parties' Agreement; and 
(2) He claims the parol evidence rule is not implicated by his affidavit because the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract. Petitioner's 
Brief ("Pet. Br.") 13-22. 
Marin's arguments are without merit: 
Marin did not offer his affidavit as evidence of the parties' "course of dealing" 
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but as extrinsic evidence of an 
additional term. 
Marin's affidavit thus implicates the parol evidence rule. While the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract, it may not be used to 
establish "new, independent duties" outside the parties' written agreement. Marin's 
reliance on the implied covenant is therefore misplaced. Marin's argument also ignores 
10 
the undisputed fact that the parties' Agreement contained a clear integration clause. The 
court of appeals was thus correct in concluding that under both the parol evidence rule 
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing the trial court properly excluded Marin's 
affidavit from consideration in granting Young Living's motion for summary judgment. 
B. Attorney fees. Marin argues that because the titial court's award of attorney 
fees was unconscionable and plainly erroneous, the court of appeals improperly held that 
Marin's objection to the award was untimely and he had therefore failed to preserve the 
issue for appeal. 
The court of appeals was correct in concluding that Marin failed to preserve the 
attorney fees issue for appeal. Young Living agrees that it is not entitled to recover 
attorney fees related to its tort and other non-contract claims, and in connection with 
issues on which it did not prevail.6 
VIIL ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, UNDER 
EITHER THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING OR THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, MARIN'S AFFIDAVIT 
WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO ADD A NEW 
TERM TO THE PARTIES' EXPRESSLY INTEGRATED WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT 
Marin claims Young Living's prior material breach of its obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing excused him from further performance under the parties' Agreement. 
6
 If Young Living prevails on this appeal, it will submit a revised affidavit of fees to the 
trial court excluding $6,754.50 for work in connection with the additional claims in its 
complaint and issues on which it did not prevail below. If Young Living does not prevail 
on this appeal, the attorney fees issue will be moot. 
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(Pet. Br. 10). As evidence of Young Living's asserted breach, Marin submitted his 
affidavit outlining purported conversations with "plaintiff Young Living before he 
signed the Agreement and with named individuals affiliated with Young Living after. 
Marin contends that he offered his affidavit not for the purpose of proving "new, 
independent rights or duties" or a "contemporaneous oral agreement," but to show "the 
parties' purpose, intentions and [his] justified expectations." (Pet. Br. 11). 
Marin asserts his "justified expectation" was that Young Living would provide 
him with "marketing tools" by a specific date. (Pet. Br. 10-11, 13-21). In his affidavit, 
Marin asserted: 
In order to induce me to enter in to the Agreement, plaintiff [Young Living] 
represented to me that it was nearing completion of a new mainstream 
marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio CD, and other marketing 
materials (hereinafter referred to as the "marketing tools"). It was clearly 
understood by both plaintiff and myself that these marketing tools would be 
absolutely necessary for me to be able to meet my performance guarantees 
under the Agreement and it was represented to me that they would be 
available for use by February 1, 2005. 
(Affidavit of Carlos Marin, dated 1 April 2007 ("Marin Affidavit"), paragraph 4; copy 
attached as Addendum 3).7 
Marin's reliance on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in support of the 
admissibility of his affidavit is misplaced for at least three reasons: 
7
 Marin has never identified the individual (or individuals) who purportedly made these 
representations, has not identified where or when they made, except to assert that it was 
prior to his signing the Agreement, and has not further described what "other marketing 
materials" means. Implicitly acknowledging that his assertions lack the required 
particularly, Marin has never claimed fraudulent inducement or fraud in connection with 
his entering the Agreement. 
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1. No evidence of "a course of dealing." Marin's affidavit provides no evidence 
of "a course of dealing" with Young Living that could have |ustified his expectation that 
he would receive "marketing tools" by a specified deiadline; indeed, the signed 
Agreement was their first contract and began the "course of dealing" between these two 
parties (see, e.g., Marin Affidavit Tf 3; Agreement [R. 120-12?]);. 
2. Instead, extrinsic evidence of a new term. Evidence to show a prior oral 
agreement about "marketing tools" and representations about when they would be ready 
is not "course of dealing" evidence, it is extrinsic evidence of "new, independent rights 
and duties" not contained in the parties' subsequent, expressly-integrated written 
Agreement; and 
3. And a dispositive undisputed fact: a clear integration clause. The clear 
o 
integration clause directly over Marin's signature in the Agreement forecloses any 
The integration clause reads, in pertinent part: 
Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto 
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and 
contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the Parties, and there 
are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties 
in connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth 
herein. No supplement, modification, amendment, wlaiver or termination of 
this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing and signed by 
the Parties hereto. ... 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Agreement 
on the date first written above. ... [Signed] CARLOS! MARIN 
(R. 6, copy at Addendum 4). Marin has never even addressed, let alone disputed, this 
clear integration clause. See R. 63 ^ 2 and 62 f 5; see dtfso R. 118-119 fflf 1-2; Rule 
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"justified expectation" that he could rely on any "prior agreements and understandings of 
the Parties" or any other "representations ... except as specifically set forth" in the 
parties' written Agreement. It also forecloses any "supplement, modification, 
amendment, waiver or termination of this Agreement ... unless executed in writing and 
signed by the Parties hereto."9 Thus, to the extent Marin relies on this Court's opinion in 
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998), to extend the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to include "express or implied obligations" or "representations" (Pet. Br. 17-19, 
citing id. at 954-55), his signature directly below this clear integration clause forecloses 
that in his case. 
In sum, although Marin asserts he is relying on the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, he has provided no evidence of any course of dealing on which he could 
justifiably rely. The clear integration clause precludes any justified expectation by Marin 
that a prior oral agreement or representation was or could be a part of the parties' final 
signed Agreement. Since Marin has never disputed or even addressed the integration 
clause, the court of appeals' conclusion that the parties' Agreement was integrated was 
not clearly erroneous. Because Marin's affidavit seeks to add a new term to an expressly 
integrated written agreement, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the parol 
evidence rule and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing preclude its admission for 
7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 6 \ 18 (emphasis added); R. 101 If 3; R. 118-119 
ffl[ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah R. Civ. P.; cf. R. 21 fflf 10-11, 14; R. 63 ^ 2 and 62 ^ 5). 
9
 Thus, any statements in Marin's affidavit about his purported conversations with Young 
Living regarding "marketing tools" after he signed the Agreement could not supplement, 
modify, or amend its terms. 
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that purpose. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT |20 f^ 11, 182 P.3d 326, 330 
(Utah 2008) (the parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud or other 
invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of 
an integrated contract"); Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 f^ 45, 
104 P.3d 1226, 1239 (Utah 2004) ("While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inheres in almost every contract, ... this covenant canndt be read to establish new, 
independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree"); Andalex Resources, Inc. 
v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994) ("the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed 
upon by the parties"), citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 8112 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah 1991); 
accord Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 955 ("a contrary holding would 'establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties'"). 
4. The Proper Legal Framework for Analysis.10 
This case marks an intersection between a clear Integration clause, the parol 
evidence rule, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and summary judgment. 
Marin seeks to extend the covenant of good faith and lair dealing so that extrinsic 
evidence may be permitted to add an oral term to an expressly integrated written 
agreement, or, at a minimum, to create a genuine issue of material fact in summary 
judgment. 
10
 For Young Living's analysis of whether the trial court properly applied this proper 
framework, see Young Living's brief at the court of appeals! at 15-19. 
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Like the court of appeals, this Court could simply hold that, since it is undisputed 
that the parties' Agreement contained a clear integration clause, Marin's affidavit is not 
admissible to add new terms to the parties' expressly integrated written agreement. But 
this Court's grant of certiorari review also creates an opportunity for the Court to reaffirm 
its prior rulings on the following principles: 
a. Contract interpretation is a question of law: "[Interpretation of a contract is 
a question of law." Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561 
(Utah 1983), citing Morris v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 
1983). 
b. The threshold question: Is the agreement integrated? Before a trial court 
can consider evidence outside the parties' written agreement, it must consider whether 
that agreement is integrated. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 % 11, 182 
P.3d 326, 330 (Utah 2008) ("[f|irst, the court must determine whether the agreement is 
integrated"), citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 
1995) (this Court affirmed where trial judge excluded parol evidence offered to add terms 
to a written agreement that was complete on its face), citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 
P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
"To determine whether a writing is an integration, a court must determine whether 
the parties adopted the writing 'as the final and complete expression of their bargain.'" 
Id., quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 
1972) (emphasis added by id.). '"[W]hen parties have reduced to writing what appears to 
be a complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of 
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fraud, that the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the parties.'" Id. 
Integration clauses 
"are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to signal to the courts 
that the parties agree that the contract is to be considered completely 
integrated. A completely integrated agreement must be interpreted on its 
face, and thus the purpose and effect of including |a merger clause is to 
preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding in which a court 
interprets the document." 
Id., quoting Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004IUT 70, \ 28, 98 P.3d 15, 25 
(Utah 2004). 
c. Whether a contract is integrated is a preliminary question of fact for 
determination by the court that may be resolved in summary judgment: "Whether a 
contract is integrated is a question of fact reviewed for clear error." Id. \ 10 at 229 {citing 
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, % 20, 144 P.3d 1096, 1103 (Ufeh 2006) ("an appellate court 
reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error"); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 
28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972) ("the courtlmust determine as a question 
of fact whether the parties did in fact adopt a particular witing or writings as the final 
and complete expression of their bargain"); cf AGIv. First Affiliated Securities, 912 F.2d 
1238, 1245 (10 Cir. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed where, under Utah law, trial 
judge refused to consider parol evidence of purported additional oral terms of expressly 
integrated written agreement). 
d. "If a contract is integrated, parol evidence is admissible only to clarify 
ambiguous terms." Tangren, 2008 UT 20, \ 11, 182 P[3d at 330. Marin has never 
claimed that the Agreement was ambiguous. 
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e. "[WJhether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness." Id, Tj 10 at 229. 
f. "If a contract is integrated, parol evidence ... is 'not admissible to vary or 
contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract.'" Id., ^ 11 at 330, 
quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995) 
(citations omitted). This holding is dispositive here. 
g. "[I]n the face of a clear integration clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate 
oral agreement is not admissible on the question of integration." Id., f 17 at 332. 
This holding may be limited to the unique facts of the Tangren case: i.e., where the 
parties offered extrinsic evidence of an oral agreement that the written agreement was 
invalid or subject to a condition precedent. Id., ^ 16 at 331. See discussion under 
sections 5 and 6 below. 
h. "Extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in the face of a clear 
integration clause, where the contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, 
lacking in consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, 
or illegality." Id., ^ 15 at 330-31, citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 
(Utah 1985); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt. c. None of these apply here 
since Marin has limited his claim to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
See R. 63 f 2 and 62 f 5; see also R. 118-119 ffif 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R. 
Civ. P. (R. 6 U 18 (emphasis added); R. 101 U 3; R. 118-119 fflf 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah 
R. Civ. P.; cf. R. 21 fflf 10-11, 14; R. 63 | 2 and 62 f 5). 
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i. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be construed to add new 
terms to a parties' agreement. "While a covenant of good [faith and fair dealing inheres 
in almost every contract, ... this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent 
rights or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante." Oakwood Vill. LLC v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^  45, 104 P.2d 1226, 1239 (ptah 2004); "[T]he covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or 
duties not agreed upon by the parties." Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 
1048 (Utah App. 1994), citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah 1991); 
accord Brown, 973 P.2d at 955 ("a contrary holding would 'establish new, independent 
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties'"). In tandem| with the parol evidence rule, 
this holding is dispositive here. 
j . "[T]he degree to which a party to a contract m$y invoke the protections of 
the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] turns ^n the extent to which the 
contracting parties have defined their expectations and I imposed limitations on the 
exercise of discretion through express contract terms." Smith v. Grand Canyon 
Expeditions, 2003 UT 57, If 20, 84 P.3d 1154, 1159-60 (Utah 2003), citing Malibu Inv. 
Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, ^ 19, 996 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Utal^ 2000). 
5. Harmonizing Oakwood, Brown, and Tangren 
As noted in the prior section, this case marks an I intersection between a clear 
integration clause, the parol evidence rule, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
and summary judgment. Because of this, none of the thre$ cases relied on primarily by 
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the court of appeals, by Marin, and by Young Living is "on all fours" with the current 
case. 
Thus, this Court's grant of certiorari review creates an opportunity for the Court to 
explicitly harmonize these three cases based on the circumstances presented in this case. 
After a review of each of these cases, we will suggest specific proposed holdings the 
Court could render to harmonize them here. 
a. Court of Appeals: Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc. The court of 
appeals relied primarily on Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f 
45, 104 P.3d 1226, 1239 (Utah 2004), in upholding the trial court's summary judgment 
ruling in Young Living's favor. 
Oakwood involved: 
• a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (not summary judgment as here); 
• the affirmative use of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
a claim for its breach (unlike Marin's use here as a claimed defense to 
breach of contract); 
• no claim of fraud or ambiguity (as here: Marin has limited his claims to 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); 
• impliedly (although not explicitly) the parol evidence rule; and, 
• although the Court found the lease in Oakwood to be "a complete and 
unambiguous agreement between competent commercial parties," it did 
not involve a "clear integration clause" in the contract at issue (unlike here; 
cf Tangren; see also Table 1 on page 28, infra). 
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Oakwood Village, LLC sued Albertsons, Inc. for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing for continuing to pay for but Inot occupy leased premises, 
and opening a competing store. Oakwood, J^ 6 at 1230 and % 42 at 1239. The trial court 
dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state ^ claim upon which relief can 
be granted, and this Court affirmed. 
In affirming, this Court noted that "Oakwood's complaint does not contain 
averments regarding the parties' course of dealings or conduct, focusing only on the 
contractual language." Id., f^ 43 at 1240. 
The Court also noted that it determines the "purpose, (intentions, and expectations" 
of the parties by considering "the contract language and the course of dealings between 
and conduct of the parties." Id, quoting St. Benedict's Dev. Co., v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991). 
The Court concluded that "Oakwood's construction of the obligation to act in 
good faith and deal fairly would violate other broader principles of contract 
interpretation" (Id, | 44 at 1240), apparently referring to the parol evidence rule. Then 
the Court made the statement quoted in part and relied on by the court of appeals in 
affirming here: 
While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every 
contract, some general principles limit the scope of the covenant. ... First, 
this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties 
to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 
P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). ... [In addition], we will not use this covenant to 
achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's sense of justice but 
inconsistent with the express terms of the applicable contract. See Dalton 
v. Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982)1 
21 
Id., \ 45 at 1249. In support of its holding, the Court noted, "[i]t is not our role to 
intervene now, construing the contract's unambiguous terms to mean something different 
from what the parties intended them to mean at the outset." Id., f 53 at 1241. The Court 
also pointed out, 
Oakwood has stated that u[f]airness in business dealings should be a 
concern to this Court." It is precisely this concern for fairness, however, 
which bars us from reading into the lease an obligation that Oakwood failed 
to secure during contract negotiations. The duty Oakwood now seeks to 
impose on Albertsons is simply not one for which the parties bargained. 
Id., J^ 55 at 1242. The court of appeals cited Oakwood and found it dispositive here. 
Young Living believes the last two sentences quoted above have particular application to 
Marin's claims. 
b. Defendant-Petitioner Marin: Brown v. Moore. In his brief before this Court, 
Marin relies primarily on Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998), as suggesting that: 
(1) a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing may arise from obligations or representations, express or 
implied, which are not found in the language of the contract itself; and (2) 
that a cause of action based upon obligations or representations not found in 
the language of the contract does not necessarily "establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." 
(Pet.Br. a t l9 ) . n 
11
 Significantly, none of the three "course of dealing" cases cited by Marin in support of 
his argument about implied terms (Pet. Br. 19) contained an integration clause. See 
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998); St. Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 2001); Andalex Resources, Inc. v Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 
1048 (Utah App. 1994); see also Tangren, n.20 at 331. 
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Brown involved: 
• summary judgment (as here); 
• the offensive use of the implied covenant off good faith and fair dealing 
in a claim for breach of contract (unlike Marin's use here as a claimed 
defense to breach of contract); 
• no claim of fraud or ambiguity (as here: Marin has limited his claims to 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); 
• impliedly (although not explicitly) the parol evidence rule; but, 
• it did not involve a "clear integration clause" in the contract at issue 
(unlike here; see n.l 1, supra at 22; see also1 Table 1 on page 28, infra). 
The plaintiffs in Brown sued the defendant for breacjh of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in its contract with plaintiffs when it took possession of a 
savings and loan institution they owned. Brown, 973 P.3d at 951. Defendant filed a 
motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted.| Plaintiffs appealed, arguing 
that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment based on its assessment of 
breach of the express and implied contractual obligations. This Court affirmed. It noted 
that, 
[Defendant] emphasizes that plaintiffs cannot identify any representation or 
promise on the part of [defendant] which would support a finding of breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, noting the limited contacts 
plaintiffs had with [defendant's] representatives prior to executing the 
purchase agreement. 
Id., at 954. The Court also indicated that, "[i]n determining (whether a party has breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
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we are not limited to an examination of the express contractual provisions; 
we will also consider the course of dealings between the parties. [Citations 
omitted). However, we will not interpret the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they 
made for themselves. [Citations omitted]. Nor will we construe the 
covenant "to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by 
the parties. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55. 
Id. The Court then stated what Marin has quoted in his brief before this Court: 
Thus, if plaintiffs are to defeat summary judgment, the course of dealings 
between the parties must disclose some other obligation, express or 
implied, on the part of [defendant] which could give rise to a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. The Court found that plaintiffs could show no express representation by defendant, 
and quoted an opinion letter issued in conjunction with the execution of the agreement 
that disclaimed any such representations. Id., at 954-55. 
"Thus," the Court concluded, "any assumption by plaintiffs that the [defendant] 
had an obligation [plaintiffs claimed] ... was not reasonable" and the lack of "express or 
implied obligations of or representations by" defendants was fatal to plaintiffs claim "of a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A contrary holding," the Court 
reasoned, "would 'establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the 
parties.'" Id., at 955, quoting Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55. 
While it goes the farthest of any Utah case in suggesting that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing could extend to "implied obligations" or "representations" by one of 
the parties, Brown's holding is unhelpful to Marin, because there was a clear integration 
clause in the Agreement Marin signed, specifically excluding implied obligations or 
"representations" from the parties' written Agreement. Indeed, without a clear 
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integration clause in Brown, the Court appeared to simply follow its precedent in 
considering "all relevant evidence" in determining whether; the parties' agreement was 
integrated, and, if not, what terms the parties intended. Hqll, 890 P.2d at 1026-27 (to 
resolve the question of integration, any relevant evidence is admissible). 
Even though Brown seems to go the farthest in support of Marin's argument, it 
stops short. In any event, the dispositive distinction betwe0n Brown and this case is the 
clear integration clause Marin signed. 
c. Plaintiff-Respondent Young Living: Tangren family Trust v. Tangren. In 
its brief before the court of appeals, and before this Court, Young Living relies primarily 
on Tangren Famly Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 Tj 11, 182 |>.3d 326, 330 (Utah 2008), in 
support of its position that the parol evidence rule precludes admission of Marin's 
affidavit. 
Tangren involved: 
• a bench trial (unlike summary judgment here); 
• the parol evidence rule (as here); 
• a "clear integration clause" in the contract $i issue (as here); but 
• it did not involve a claim related to the breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing (cf. Oakwood and Brown)', and 
In Tangren, this Court disavowed Hall to the extent it was read to "suggest that extrinsic 
evidence of a separate oral agreement is admissible where the contract contains a clear 
integration clause." Tangren, n.20 at 331 (emphasis in original). 
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• it did not involve a claim of fraud or ambiguity (as here: Marin has 
limited his claims to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) 
{see also Table 1 on page 28, infra). 
In Tangren, the trustee of the Tangren Family Trust prepared a 99-year lease for 
his son to protect his interest in a ranch property. The lease included a clear integration 
clause: "Entire Agreement: This Lease contains the entire understanding between the 
parties with respect to its subject-matter, the Property and all aspects of the relationship 
between Lessee and Lessor." 
The relationship between father and son later deteriorated, the son recorded the 
lease, and the father demanded payment which the son tendered by way of checks the 
father never cashed. Ultimately, the father filed suit for breach of lease and damages for 
removal of property. During the bench trial, the father amended his complaint to allege 
breach, but also that the lease "did not form a valid contract between the parties because 
the conditions upon which it was entered into were never met." The son counterclaimed. 
A/., Tflf 2-6 at 327-28. 
Both father and son testified that the lease was not intended to be valid between 
them, but to protect the son's interest from his siblings. The trial court agreed, 
determined the son had no obligation to pay rent and ordered the son off the ranch. The 
son appealed. Id, ffif 7-8 at 328-29. 
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the trial court properly considered 
extrinsic evidence in assessing whether the lease was an integration, but that it erred in 
relying on the father's testimony regarding his intent in creating the lease in the face of a 
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clear and unambiguous integration clause in the lease itself. The court of appeals found 
that the parties entered into a "valid, integrated, and unambiguous lease agreement" and 
remanded for the trial court to determine whether the son breiached the lease. 
This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in its 
assessment of the parol evidence rule. Id., f 9 at 329. 
The Court outlined the well-settled principles of the parol evidence rule and the 
two-step analysis regarding integration and ambiguity: fnist, the court must determine 
whether the agreement is integrated (a question of fact); land, second, the court must 
determine whether the language of the agreement is ambiguous (a question of law). If the 
court finds an agreement is integrated and its terms are unambiguous, parol evidence is 
inadmissible to vary or add to the terms of the agreement, !§., ^ 10-13 at 329-30. 
In Tangren, the Court found that the plaintiffs argument "amounts to a contention 
that a separate oral understanding overrides the written Lease's clear integration clause. 
We reject this argument." Id., \ 14 at 330. The Court further noted, 
To argue that the Lease is not the complete agreement of the parties is to 
argue in direct contradiction to the clear integration clause. Thus, we will 
not allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on 
the question of integration in the face of a clear integration clause. To the 
extent any of our prior cases provide otherwise, we overrule those cases. 
Id., \ 16 at 331. The Court likewise concluded that the court of appeals' consideration of 
extrinsic evidence about a separate oral agreement or condition precedent related to the 
agreement was improper since the lease contained "a cleiar integration clause": "We 
conclude that the Lease is integrated and that its terms are unambiguous. Thus, the parol 
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evidence rule bars the admission of all extrinsic evidence regarding the Lease." Id.,% 19 
at 332. 
Since the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not at issue in 
Tangren, the Court did not explicitly extend its holdings to apply where a claimed breach 
of that covenant is at issue. 
See Table 1 below for a summary comparison of the issues in these cases with the 
issues in this case: 
Table 1: Summary of Issues: Oakwood, Brown^ and Tangren - and this case 
ISSUES/LAW 
Offensive Use of 
Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair 
| Dealing 
Defensive Use of 
Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair 
| Dealing 
"Clear Integration 
Clause" 
Claim of Fraud 
Claim of 
Ambiguity 
Parol Evidence 
Rule 
Summary 
Judgment 
OAKWOOD 
Relied on by 
court of appeals 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
{Implied) 
NO 
BROWN 
Relied on by 
Marin 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
{Implied) 
NO 
TANGREN 
Relied on by 
Young Living 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YLv. Marin 
{This case) 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
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6. Proposed holdings harmonizing Oakwood, Brown, and Tangren 
Young Living suggests this Court can harmonize in this case the holdings of these 
three cases, to wit: 
a. Like all contract terms, integration depends on the contracting parties' intent. 
The law favors writings to most clearly express the contracting parties' intent that the 
writing embodies their whole agreement. Thus, if a written agreement contains a clear 
integration clause, no extrinsic evidence is to be considered nor is it admissible on the 
issue of integration, or to add to or vary terms of the written agreement. See Tangren, 
and Tables 2 and 3 on pages 31 and 32, infra. 
b. In the absence of a clear integration clause, the trial court considers all relevant 
evidence to determine whether an agreement is integrated. If it is not integrated, the trial 
court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the terms of the parties' agreement. 
See Tangren and Hall, and Table 2 on page 31, infra. 
c. Even where there is a clear integration clause or the trial court finds based on 
all relevant evidence that an agreement is integrated, extrinsic evidence is nevertheless 
admissible to show the contract is void because it is a joke, sham, forgery, or is lacking in 
consideration, or to show the contract is voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or 
illegality. See Tangren and Brown, and Tables 2 and 3 on pages 31 and 32, infra. 
d. Whereas extrinsic evidence may be admitted under the parol evidence rule only 
to explain or clarify ambiguous terms of an integrated agreement, and extrinsic evidence 
may also be admitted under a claim of the breach of the iimplied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing only to show one party prevented another party's performance or that 
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party's receipt of the benefits the contract, in neither case may extrinsic evidence ever be 
admitted to add to or vary terms of an unambiguous, integrated written agreement. See 
Oakwood, Brown, and Tangren, and Table 3 on page 32, infra. 
inn 
urn 
Hill 
Hill 
mil 
urn 
urn 
urn 
urn 
Hill 
Hill 
Hill 
mil 
mil 
urn 
mil 
urn 
mil 
urn 
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Table 2: Integration 
Clear Integration Clause v. Relevant Extrinsic Evidence 
General Rule: 
Where an agreement contains a clear integration clause, 
extrinsic evidence may not be admitted on the issue of integration 
If "Clear 
Integration 
Clause": 
Integrated 
No Extrinsic 
Evidence 
Relevant Extrinsic Evidence 
Is Admissible 
on the Issue of Integration 
ONLY IF the Agreement Does 
A/OrContain 
a "Clear Integration Clause" 
Exceptions: 
Even where there is a "Clear Integration Clause" OR an agreement is otherwise found to be integrated, 
extrinsic evidence may be used to show a contract is VOID (as a joke, sham, fraud, or forgery, or 
for lack of consideration) OR VOIDABLE(for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality) 
Sources: Tangren, U 17 at 332 (circle & rectangle); Hall, 890 P.2d at 1026-27 (circle) 
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Table 3: Integration 
Parol Evidence Rule and the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing 
General Rule: 
Where parties have an integrated agreement, 
extrinsic evidence may not be used to add to or vary its terms 
"Clear Integration 
Clause" OR Otherwise 
Integrated: 
No Extrinsic Evidence is 
Admissible to Add to or 
Vary Contract Terms 
Parol Evidence Rule: 
Extrinsic Evidence is 
Admissible ONLY to 
Clarify 
AMBIGUOUS TERMS 
Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing: 
Course of Dealing Evidence is Admissible 
ONLY to Show 
PREVENTED PERFORMANCE 
OF CONTRACT TERMS 
Exceptions: 
Even where there is a "Clear Integration Clause" OR an agreement is otherwise found to be integrated, 
extrinsic evidence may be used to show a contract is VOID (as a joke, sham, fraud, or forgery, or 
for lack of consideration) OR VOIDABLE {tor fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality) 
Sources: Oakwood, H 45 at 1226 (circle & main rectangle); Brown, 973 P.2d at 954 (circle & main 
rectangle); Tangren, ffll 11 & 15 at 330, 331 (both rectangles) 
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e. Evidence admitted under the parol evidence rule topically, although not always, 
involves the contracting parties' words or representations, while course of dealing and 
conduct evidence admitted on the issue of a breach of the injiplied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing typically, although not always, involves the contracting parties' actions. 
The contracting parties words and actions (i.e., representations outside the written 
contract, course of dealing, and conduct) all fall under the definition of "extrinsic 
evidence." Where parties have an integrated agreement, no extrinsic evidence may be 
used to add to or alter its terms. Oakwood, Brown and Tangren, and Table 3 on page 32, 
supra. 
In harmonizing its prior holdings, this Court could dlso explicitly adopt the well-
reasoned holding in United States Construction Corporation v. Harbor Bay Estates, Ltd., 
876 N.E.2d 637, f 42 at 643 (Ohio 2007) (copy at Addendum 5), to wit: "The implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to make an end run around 
the parol evidence rule." Id., quoting McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., 8th Dist. No. 
79025, 2002-Ohio-7220, 2002 WL 31875200,124 (Emphadis added). 
7. Conclusion 
Based on the clear integration clause in the parties' Agreement, the court of 
appeals correctly concluded under both the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and the parol evidence rule that Marin's affidavit was not admissible to add a 
term to the parties' Agreement. Since the court of appeals!' conclusion was correct, this 
Court should affirm and award Young Living its fees and costs. 
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B. MARIN FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
FOR APPEAL 
This Court recently instructed: 
[t]o preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a timely 
and specific objection" before the trial court. We will not address an issue 
if it is not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for 
seeking review. 
K U.F. v. W.P. W. P.3d , 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) (quoting State v. Low, 
192 P.3d 867 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (copy at Addendum 1). 
In this case, Marin did not raise a timely objection to Young Living's Proposed 
Judgment or to Young Living's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), "[objections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service." Here, Young Living filed 
and served its Proposed Final Judgment and Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees on 27 May 
2008. (R. 505, 492). Following this Marin was allowed five (5) days, plus three (3) days 
for service by mail (Rule 6(e)), by which to file any objection to the Proposed Final 
Judgment including the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, making any objection 
due on 6 June 2008. Marin did not file his objection with the trial court until 11 June 
2008. (R. 499). 
Thus, Marin did not timely object to Young Living's Proposed Final Judgment 
and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. By failing to do so, Marin failed to preserve 
the issue of the reasonableness of Young Living's attorney's fees for appeal. 
13 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 defines "Judgment" as used in the rules as a 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies. 
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In any event, Young Living agrees that it is not entitled to recover attorney fees 
related to its tort and other non-contract claims, and in connection with issues on which it 
did not prevail. Thus, if Young Living prevails in this appeal, it will submit a revised 
affidavit of attorney fees to the trial court excluding $6,7514.50 for work in connection 
with the additional claims in its Complaint and issues on which it did not prevail below. 
If Young Living does not prevail on this appeal, the attorney fees issue will be moot since 
the case will be remanded for trial, and since Marin did not jappeal the trial court's denial 
of his "counter-motion" for summary judgment. 
In response to some of Marin's additional arguments related to fees: 
1. "No findings of fact as to attorney fees." The tifial court made no findings of 
fact as to the attorney fees award because Marin's objection was untimely and the award 
was therefore uncontested. 
2. "Simple breach of contract case." Because fylarin evaded service, Young 
Living expended additional fees and costs. It ultimately obtained an order for service by 
publication (R. 36-48). 
Because of the issues raised by Marin in his affidavit and his "countermotion" for 
summary judgment (the denial of which Marin has not appqaled), and without the benefit 
of the Tangren case which was decided later, Young Living sought for and obtained 
Marin's approval of extensions to respond which it used to dlo: 
• detailed interviews of those who might have made thp central representation Marin 
claimed in his affidavit (Marin's affidavit failed to provide a time or place of the 
representation, or the identity of the person making the purported representation); 
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• a review of email communications between the parties (R. 171-287, 465-487); 
• a review of a companion agreement of Marin's upline supervisor related to the 
production of "marketing tools" (R. 180-232); and 
• research regarding Marin's experience in developing "marketing tools" (R. 184-
203, 238-252, 256-272). 
Vvz-Tangren, Young Living was prudent in fulfilling its obligation under Hall to provide 
"all relevant" evidence to the trial court on the issue of integration. It is thus 
disingenuous of Marin to claim Young Living's inefficiency when his assertions were the 
cause of the additional work occasioned by his affidavit and "countermotion" for 
summary judgment, and when he granted the extensions requested. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals correctly ruled that Marin's affidavit could not be admitted to 
add an oral term to the parties' expressly integrated written agreement. 
Marin did not preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for appeal. 
This Court should affirm the court of appeals and award Young Living its costs 
and fees, including on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this /(&Hi day of April, 2010. 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
}Ot^ 
Barnard N. Madsen 
Attorneys for Respondent Young Living 
Essential Oils, LC 
36 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ITtfc I certify that on the ' I day of April, 2010, I caused twO true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be sent by first-class mail, prepaid, to the following: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
:Attorney for Petitioner Carlos Marin 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
H.U.F. and G.F., Petitioners and Appellees, 
v. 
W.P.W., Respondent and Appellant. 
No. 20070610. 
Feb. 10,2009. 
Background: Putative father filed motion to inter-
vene in adoption proceeding. Following a hearing, 
the Fourth District, Provo Department, Lynn W. 
Davis, J., granted adoptive parent's motions to dis-
miss and strike putative father's motion to inter-
vene, and putative father appealed. The Court of 
Appeals certified the case for immediate transfer. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate 
C.J., held that: 
(1) putative father's arguments on appeal were not 
moot; 
(2) putative father did not comply with Arizona re-
quirements to preserve his parental rights, as re-
quired in order to qualify for exception to Utah stat-
ute that denied putative fathers who did not register 
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest 
adoptions; 
(3) evidence was sufficient to establish that putative 
father had reason to believe that mother had moved 
to Utah and thus was required to register with Of-
fice of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his par-
ental rights and intervene in the adoption proceed-
ing; 
(4) Arizona paternity order was entitled to full faith 
and credit; but 
(5) error of trial court in concluding that Arizona 
order was not entitled to full faith and credit was 
harmless, as such order had no bearing on putative 
father's right to challenge adoption; 
(6) trial court could make findings of fact without 
providing putative father with an evidentiary hear-
ing; and 
(7) putative father's appeal was not frivolous. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(1) 
30 Appeal and E^ror 
30XVI Review 
30XV1(4) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k83£j Questions Considered 
30kB42 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Supreme Court review a district court's interpreta-
tion of a statute for correctness. 
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^>1008.1(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(|l) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI|(I)3 Findings of Court 
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General 
30k 1008.1 In General 
30k 1008.1 (5) k. Clearly Erro-
neous Findings. Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court reviews a district court's findings of 
fact under a clearly erroneous standard. 
(3 j Appeal andlError 30 € ^ 8 4 2 ( 1 ) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XV1 ReviJw 
30XVT(fO Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30M842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are o|f Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Supreme Court reviews a district court's ruling re-
garding a statutes constitutionality for correctness. 
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f4] Appeal and Error 30 €^>843(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
3OX.VI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k843 Matters Not Necessary to De-
cision on Review 
30k843(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
An argument is moot on appeal if the requested ju-
dicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants. 
[5] Adoption 17 € ^ 1 5 
17 Adoption 
17k.9 Judicial Proceedings 
17k!5 k. Review. Most Cited Cases 
Putative father's arguments on appeal of trial court 
orders regarding his attempt to intervene in adop-
tion proceeding were not moot on the ground that 
he only addressed trial court's order granting adopt-
ive parents' motion to dismiss putative father's mo-
tion to intervene and did not address trial court's or-
der granting adoptive parent's motion to strike mo-
tion to intervene based on putative father's false as-
sertions, where putative father in his opening brief 
challenged trial court's finding that putative father 
had knowledge that birth mother was in Utah, and, 
though putative father did not explicitly state he 
was challenging the motion to strike, the challenge 
was substantially briefed. 
[6J Adoption 17 €=^>15 
17 Adoption 
17k9 Judicial Proceedings 
17k 15 k. Review. Most Cited Cases 
Putative father did not preserve for appeal a due 
process challenge and equal protection challenge, in 
his appeal of trial court order dismissing and strik-
ing his motion to intervene in adoption proceeding, 
where putative father's motion to intervene in the 
trial court did not raise a due process or equal pro-
tection challenge, and trial court's rulings did not 
consider a due process or equal protection chal-
lenge. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; Rules 
App.Prpc, Rule 24(a). 
[7] Appeal and Error 30 0 ^ 1 6 9 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30k 169 k. Necessity of Presentation in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court will not address an issue if it is not 
preserved or if the appellant has not established 
other grounds for seeking review. Rules App.Proc, 
Rule 24(a). 
[8] Adoption 17 €^7.2(3) 
17 Adoption 
17k7 Consent of Parties 
17k7.2 Natural Parents, Necessity of Consent 
in General 
17k7.2(3) k. Illegitimate Children. Most 
Cited Cases 
Putative father, who resided in Arizona where 
mother also resided and failed to register with Utah 
Office of Vital Statistics, failed to comply with the 
most stringent and complete Arizona statutory re-
quirements to preserve his parental rights, as re-
quired in order to qualify for exception to Utah stat-
ute that denied putative fathers who did not register 
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest 
adoptions; Arizona statute required a putative father 
to initiate a paternity action within 30 days of re-
ceiving notice that a birth mother intended to give a 
child up for adoption, birth mother served putative 
father with notice stating that if he wished to assert 
his parental rights he "must" start a paternity action 
within 30 days, notice putative father received was 
not ambiguous, and putative father did not start his 
paternity action in Arizona within 30 days of re-
ceipt of the notice. U.C.A.I953, 78-30-4.14 
(Repealed); A.R.S. §8-106(G). 
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361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VT(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
36lkl88 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
When interpreting a statute, courts look first to the 
statute's plain language to determine its meaning. 
(101 Statutes 361 €>^>205 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36Ik204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k205 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statutes 361 €=^208 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36lk204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
36lk208 k. Context and Related 
Clauses. Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €=^223.2(.5) 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k223 Construction with Reference to 
Other Statutes 
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to the 
Same Subject Matter in General 
361k223.2(.5) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
When interpreting a statute, courts read the plain 
language of a statute as a whole and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the 
same statute and with other statutes under the same 
and related chapters. 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 lkl 80 Intention of Legislature 
361M81 In General 
361kl81(2)k. Effect and Con-
sequences. Most) Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €^=>206 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A)]General Rules of Construction 
361k2D4 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
|361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire 
Statute. Most Cited Cases 
When interpreting a statute, courts seek an inter-
pretation that reinders all parts of a statute relevant 
and meaningful and interpretations are to be 
avoided which render some part of a provision non-
sensical or absutd. 
[12] Appeal antf Error 30 €^1008.1(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XV|(J)3 Findings of Court 
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General 
30k 1008.1 In General 
30k 1008 J (5) k. Clearly Erro-
neous Findings.IMost Cited Cases 
Supreme Court jwill overturn a district court's find-
ings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. 
[131 Adoption \1 €^>7.8(4) 
17 Adoption 
17k7 Consent of Parties 
17k7.8 Evidence 
17k7i(3) Weight and Sufficiency 
17k7.8(4) k. Necessity of Consent in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Jill Statutes 361 €>^>181(2) Adoption 17 € ^ 1 1 
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17 Adoption 
17k9 Judicial Proceedings 
17k 11 k. Petition and Parties. Most Cited 
Cases 
Evidence was sufficient to establish, at hearing on 
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike pu-
tative father's motion to intervene in Utah adoption 
proceeding, that putative father, who resided in Ari-
zona where birth mother also resided, had reason to 
know that mother moved to Utah, and thus that pu-
tative father was required to register with Utah Of-
fice of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his par-
ental rights and intervene in the adoption proceed-
ing; though mother sent e-mail to putative father 
one week after she obtained protective order against 
him in Arizona denying that she moved to Utah, 
father in open court at hearing on mother's request 
for protective order testified that she told him she 
moved to Utah. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.14 
(Repealed). 
[14] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H € ^ 6 4 
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 
76HV Paternity Proceedings 
76Hk63 Judgment or Order 
76Hk64 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H € ^ 6 8 
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 
76HV Paternity Proceedings 
76Hk63 Judgment or Order 
76Hk68 k. Operation and Effect. Most 
Cited Cases 
Arizona paternity order, finding that putative father 
was the biological father, complied with Arizona 
requirements for a judgment, for purposes of de-
termining whether the order was entitled to full 
faith and credit when putative father sought to in-
tervene in Utah adoption proceeding; though order 
was not executed by a judge and copy provided to 
Utah court was not certified, Arizona law only re-
quired that the judgment be in writing and signed 
by a judge or a court commissioner duly authorized 
to do so, and paternity order was in writing and 
signed by a deputy clerk. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 
1; 16 A.R.S. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 58(a). 
f 151 Judgment 228 €^=>815 
228 Judgment 
228XV1I Foreign Judgments 
228k814 Judgments of State Courts 
228k8l5 k. Adjudications Operative in 
Other States. Most Cited Cases 
As to matters of jurisdiction, a judgment is entitled 
to full faith and credit if the same issue as to juris-
diction was raised in the foreign court and adjudic-
ated therein. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1. 
[161 Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H ©^>68 
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 
76HV Paternity Proceedings 
76Hk63 Judgment or Order 
7611k68 k. Operation and Effect. Most 
Cited Cases 
Arizona order of paternity regarding putative father 
was entitled to full faith and credit, when putative 
father sought to intervene in Utah adoption pro-
ceeding, though the Arizona court determined that 
it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody as the 
child did not reside in Arizona and had not resided 
in Arizona in the previous six months, as a lack of 
jurisdiction over custody did not equate to a lack of 
jurisdiction over a paternity determination, and the 
Arizona court took testimony, considered its juris-
diction regarding paternity and determined that the 
putative father was the biological father. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Art. 4, § 1; A.R.S. §§ 8-106(G), 
25-I002(3)(a), 25-1031. 
[17] Adoption 17 €=^15 
17 Adoption 
17k9 Judicial Proceedings 
17k 15 k. Review. Most Cited Cases 
Error of Utah court, when it granted adoptive par-
ents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's 
motion to intervene in adoption proceeding, in con-
cluding that Arizona paternity order was not en-
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titled to full faith and credit, was harmless error, as 
the Arizona paternity order had not bearing on pu-
tative father's right to contest the adoption; under 
Arizona the law the right to contest paternity was a 
separate and distinct right from the right to contest 
an adoption, and the Arizona court concluded that it 
did not have jurisdiction to determine custody. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; A.R.S. § 8-106(G). 
[181 Appeal and Error 30 €^>1026 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVT Review 
30XV1(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)1 In General 
30kl025 Prejudice to Rights of Party 
as Ground of Review 
30k 1026 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently incon-
sequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
it affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
(191 Adoption 17 €^>7.2(3) 
17 Adoption 
17k7 Consent of Parties 
17k7.2 Natural Parents, Necessity of Consent 
in General 
17k7.2(3) k. Illegitimate Children. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under Arizona law, the right to contest paternity is 
distinct from the right to contest an adoption, as a 
putative father may establish paternity at any time, 
but he may only establish the right to contest an ad-
option if: (1) he initiates a paternity action within 
30 days of receiving notice of a planned adoption, 
and (2) that action results in a paternity order. 
A.R.S. §8 - 106(G). 
[20] Adoption 17 C=>11 
17 Adoption 
17k9 Judicial Proceedings 
17k 11 k. Petition and Parties. Most Cited 
Cases 
Trial court could make findings of fact, in hearing 
on adoptive parents' motion to dismiss and strike 
putative father's motion to intervene in adoption 
proceeding, without holding an evidentiary hearing, 
where the trial cpurt provided the parties the oppor-
tunity to present evidence, counsel for putative 
father requested! that the matter be argued only on 
the law and objected to an evidentiary argument, 
the parties did not present any evidence, and the tri-
al court relied 6n facts in the record to make its 
findings. Rules p v . P r o c , Rule 43(b). 
[211 Costs 102 €^>260(5) 
102 Costs 
102X On Appeal or Error 
102k259 Damages and Penalties for Frivol-
ous Appeal and belay 
102k2f>0 Right and Grounds 
102k260(5) k. Nature and Form of 
Judgment, Actic-n, or Proceedings for Review. Most 
Cited Cases 
Putative father's! appeal of trial court order granting 
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike pu-
tative father's njotion to intervene in adoption pro-
ceeding was no|t frivolous, and thus adoptive par-
ents were not entitled to their attorney fees on ap-
peal; though putative father did not prevail, Su-
preme Court foi^nd that putative father's appeal was 
not moot as argued by adoptive parents, though pu-
tative father failed to preserve two issues he raised 
on appeal he raised other issues that were properly 
before the Supreme Court, putative father's argu-
ment that had np reason to know that mother was in 
Utah was not made in bad faith, and putative fath-
er's challenge t<^  the lack of an evidentiary hearing 
was made in |ood faith. Rules App.Proc, Rule 
33(b). 
Hutch U. Fale, Provo, Nathan E. Burdsal, Salt Lake 
City, for petitioners. 
H. Mifflin Williams, III, Salt Lake City, Claudia 
McGee Henry, f^ os Angeles, CA, for respondent. 
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 1| 1 In this case, W.P.W. ("Putative Father") 
challenges the adoption of Baby Girl Stine 
("B.G.S."), arguing that the district court erred in 
ordering the adoption of B.G.S. without his con-
sent. H.U.F. and G.F. ("Adoptive Parents") defend 
the district court's order by arguing that the Putative 
Father's consent to the adoption was not necessary 
because he failed to comply with the statutory re-
quirements that give a putative father the right to 
contest an adoption. 
K 2 Specifically, the parties raise the following is-
sues on appeal: 
(1) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot be-
cause he appealed only one of two dispositive or-
ders; 
(2) Whether Utah's statutory scheme for adoptions 
violated the Putative Father's due process and 
equal protection rights, and whether these consti-
tutional challenges were preserved; 
(3) Whether the Putative Father complied with Utah 
Code section 78-30-4.14, which establishes the 
requirements a putative father must meet before 
he may contest an adoption; 
(4) Whether the district court should have granted 
full faith and credit to Arizona's Paternity Order; 
(5) Whether the district court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing; and 
(6) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is frivol-
ous, warranting the award of attorney fees to the 
Adoptive Parents. 
U 3 We affirm the district court's decision. 
Page 6 
2009 UT 10 
BACKGROUND 
K 4 On or about September 22, 2005, while the 
Birth Mother was pregnant with B.G.S., she served 
two men with notice that she intended to place her 
baby for adoption through LDS Family Services in 
Mesa, Arizona. The notice stated that if its recipient 
wished to assert parental rights to the baby, he was 
required to initiate a paternity action pursuant to 
Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 within thirty 
days of receipt of the notice. The notice also in-
cluded the full text of Arizona Revised Statute sec-
tion 8-106. In addition, the Birth Mother published 
public notices in Arizona newspapers four times 
over a period of four weeks between September and 
October 2005. The public notices were addressed 
to, "William Patrick Wilks or Nathaniel Davis or 
John Doe." 
H 5 In response, the Putative Father filed a Notice 
of Claim of Paternity with the Arizona Office of 
Vital Records on September 29, 2005. This filing 
placed the Putative Father's name on the Putative 
Father Registry in Arizona. As a registrant, the Pu-
tative Father had the right to be identified by the vi-
tal statistics office if the office were to receive a 
search letter regarding the child whom the Putative 
Father claimed he fathered. Thereafter, the entity 
assisting in the placement of the child for adoption 
would be responsible for notifying the Putative 
Father of any legal proceedings regarding the child. 
The vital statistics office indicated in a letter to the 
Putative Father that he must follow the provisions 
of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 to estab-
lish paternity. 
U 6 In February 2006, the Birth Mother filed a peti-
tion with an Arizona justice court seeking a protect-
ive order against the Putative Father. A hearing was 
held on the matter on February 7. At the hearing, 
counsel representing the Birth Mother stated that 
the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get away from 
[the Putative Father], and to be up there, and that's 
where she is, and there's no need for [the Putative 
Father] to be allowed to harass her.'The Putative 
Father responded, "Yes, um [the Birth Mother] told 
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me when she moved to Utah." 
*2 % 7 The Putative Father never registered with the 
Utah Office of Vital Statistics as a putative father. 
\ 8 On February 15, 2006, one hundred and forty-
five days after being served with notice that the 
Birth Mother intended to place her baby for adop-
tion, the Putative Father filed a petition for patern-
ity with the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa 
County. Because the Putative Father failed to prop-
erly serve the Birth Mother, the petition was not 
granted. 
11 9 B.G.S. was born in Utah on March 4, 2006. 
Two days later, in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah, the Birth Mother willingly relinquished all 
of her parental rights and responsibilities to the Ad-
optive Parents. The Birth Mother also stated to the 
district court that she was not, nor had she ever 
been, married to the natural father of B.G.S. and 
that the identity of the father was unknown. Fur-
ther, she stated that the natural father had not initi-
ated a paternity action in Utah, despite having actu-
al notice that the Birth Mother had moved to Utah 
PNJ1 
and planned to give birth to the baby in Utah. 
f 10 On March 15, 2006, the Adoptive Parents filed 
a petition for temporary custody and guardianship 
and a verified petition for adoption, wherein they 
indicated that "[p]ursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-30-4.14, the consent of the natural mother is the 
only consent required in order for the Court to grant 
the instant petition."They further stated that the 
presumed natural father had actual notice and 
knowledge that the Birth Mother resided in Utah 
and that she intended to give birth in Utah, They 
also stated that the presumed natural father had not 
registered with the Office of Vital Statistics in the 
Utah Department of Health, nor had he begun a pa-
ternity proceeding in the State of Utah. On March 
17, 2006, the district court granted the Adoptive 
Parents "full and complete custody and guardian-
ship of [B.G.S.] until such time when the Court is-
sues a final order concerning Petitioner's Petition 
for Adoption." 
f 11 On April 1 
petitioned the Superior 
County for a 
failed to properly 
2006, the Putative Father again 
Court of Arizona, Maricopa 
declaration of paternity. Again, he 
serve the Birth Mother. 
H 12 On July 25,12006, in the Superior Court of Ari-
zona, the Putative Father filed a Voluntary Petition 
for Order of Patbrnity signed by the Birth Mother. 
In an order dated August 2, 2006, the Arizona court 
"note[d]" that this voluntary petition "resolvfed] the 
paternity issue."! The court also noted that it lacked 
jurisdiction to determine custody or child support 
and ordered that the matter be transferred to Utah 
for further proceedings. 
H 13 On July 27|, 2006, the Putative Father reques-
ted that the Utah court open the sealed Utah file re-
garding the adopjtion proceedings. Then, in the Utah 
court on September 1, 2006, the Putative Father 
filed an intervener's response to the petition for ad-
option. In an affidavit filed with the court, the Pu-
tative Father stated that the Birth Mother told him 
"verbally and bf e-mail ... that she would not give 
affiant's baby up for adoption and that she would 
always keep in iouch with affiant."Further, the Pu-
tative Father stalted in the affidavit that he "had no 
knowledge whatsoever, and received no notice 
whatsoever that [the Birth Mother] resided in Utah 
and intended to give birth to [B.G.S.] in Utah." 
the 
*3 H 14 On August 
ber 27, 2006, 
davit stating to 
the Putative Fa 
Utah or planned 
second affidavit 
mail that she ha< 
ruary 14, 2006, 
order hearing, 
made me tell al( 
moved to Utah 
any intentions ;of 
31, 2006, and again on Novem-
Birth Mother submitted an affi-
the Utah court that she never gave 
ther notice that she had moved to 
to give birth in Utah. With the 
, the Birth Mother included an e-
l sent to the Putative Father on Feb-
one week following the protective 
The e-mail stated, "[my parents] 
my friends and some family that I 
when I really didn't, nor do I have 
moving to Utah." 
1) 15 On December 
moved to dism 
the adoption 
iss 
ana 
12, 2006, the Adoptive Parents 
the Putative Father's objection to 
motion to intervene. On February 
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2, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the mat-
ter. Counsel for the Putative Father requested that 
the matter be argued only on the law and objected 
to an evidentiary argument. The court declined to 
determine the type of hearing and, instead, left the 
matter up to counsel. At the hearing, the parties did 
not present any evidence. The Putative Father was 
present, but his counsel did not call him to testify. 
U 16 On April 17, 2007, the district court issued one 
ruling that granted the Motion to Strike and the Mo-
tion to Dismiss. In the ruling, the district court 
barred the affidavits submitted by the Birth Mother, 
finding that they contradicted "the law of the case" 
and were obtained unethically. Next, the court de-
clined to give full faith and credit to the Arizona 
court's statement regarding the Putative Father's pa-
ternity, finding that the Arizona court lacked juris-
diction to issue an order of paternity; the court also 
highlighted additional problems with the order it-
self. Finally, the court ruled that the Putative Father 
failed to comply with the Utah statutory require-
ments for out-of-state putative fathers. Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that the Putative Father 
"lack[ed] standing to challenge this adoption," and 
"Petitioners' Motion to Strike the Objection and to 
Dismiss the Motion to Intervene is hereby granted." 
K 17 The Putative Father appealed, and the court of 
appeals heard oral argument in the case. After oral 
argument, but before any decision issued in this 
case, the court of appeals issued a split decision in 
In re K C.J. " Concerned that its decision in this 
case might conflict with its decision in KC.J., the 
court of appeals certified this case for immediate 
transfer to us, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 43(a). In K.C.J., the court of appeals 
held that where the district court becomes aware of 
a putative father's interest and desire to participate 
in the adoption proceeding, the court should allow 
the father to participate, at least to the extent of lit-
igating th£ legitimacy of his right to contest the ad-
option. ' " We need not reach the issue presented 
in K.C.J., however, because the Adoptive Parents 
have not challenged the Putative Father's right to 
adjudicate whether he may contest the adoption of 
B.G.S. Rather, the Adoptive Parents make substant-
ive arguments regarding whether the Putative Fath-
er has the right to contest the adoption. 
*4 T| 18 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[l][2][3fli 19 The Putative Father challenges the 
district court's interpretation of Utah and Arizona 
statutes, the district court's finding that the Putative 
Father failed to comply with Utah and Arizona stat-
utes, and the constitutionality of Utah's statutory re-
quirements for putative fathers to establish parental 
rights. We review a district court's interpretation of 
a statute for correctness. ' We review a district 
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard. * * And we review a district court's ruling 
regarding a statute's constitutionality for correct-
ANALYSIS 
f 20 As threshold issues, we first address (1) 
whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot, and 
(2) whether the Putative Father preserved a due 
process and an equal protection challenge. Holding 
that the appeal is not moot but that the Putative 
Father failed to preserve a due process and an equal 
protection challenge, we then address (3) whether 
the Putative Father complied with Utah Code sec-
tion 78-30-4.15 (2005), and (4) whether the 
district court should have given full faith and credit 
to the Arizona court's paternity order. Finally, we 
turn to (5) whether the district court should have 
held an evidentiary hearing, and (6) whether the Pu-
tative Father's appeal is frivolous, warranting attor-
ney fees. 
I. THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S CLAIMS ARE 
NOT MOOT BECAUSE HE CHALLENGED THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
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ONLY RULING 
[4jffl 21 An argument is moot "[i]f the requested ju-
dicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
1 V f „FN8 litigants. 
[5]K 22 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putat-
ive Father's arguments on appeal are moot because 
they only address one of two dispositive orders by 
the district court. Particularly, the Adoptive Parents 
argue that the Putative Father only contests the dis-
trict court's order granting the Motion to Dismiss 
Alleged Biological Father's Objection and Motion 
to Intervene ("Motion to Dismiss"), without con-
testing the district court's order granting the Motion 
to Strike the Objection and Motion to Intervene 
("Motion to Strike"). The Adoptive Parents state 
that these motions served different purposes. The 
Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Putative Father 
failed to establish "that he is entitled to any interest 
or right to intervene."The Motion to Strike asserted 
that the Putative Father's attempt to intervene was 
FN9 based upon a false assertion of a material fact 
and should therefore be stricken. 
% 23 The Putative Father argues in his reply brief 
that in his opening brief he did challenge the court's 
order granting the Motion to Strike. In his opening 
brief, the Putative Father challenged the district 
court's finding that the Putative Father had know-
ledge that the Birth Mother was in Utah. Although 
this challenge to the Motion to Strike is not expli-
cit-nowhere does the Putative Father state that he is 
challenging the Motion to Strike-the challenge is 
nonetheless substantively briefed. Accordingly, we 
hold that the Putative Father challenged the Motion 
to Strike; therefore, the Putative Father's arguments 
on appeal are not moot. 
II. THE PUTATIVE FATHER FAILED TO PRE-
SERVE HIS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION CHALLENGES 
*5 [6]1f 24 The Adoptive Parents contend that the 
Putative Father failed to preserve a due process 
challenge and an equal protection challenge in the 
district court. They are correct. 
[7]^| 25 The pr0servation requirement is found in 
rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which provides, in relevant part, that for 
each issue raised on appeal, an appellant's brief 
must include a 'citation to the record showing that 
the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a state-
ment of grounds] for seekingjreview of an issue not 
preserved in the 
sue for appeal, 
court, 
preserved or if 
n5fi 1(L trial court." To preserve an is-
the appellant must have raised "a 
timely.^ and specific objection" before the trial 
We will not address an issue if it is not 
the appellant has not established 
FN 12 other grounds fqr seeking review 
U 26 Rather than advancing grounds upon which we 
may review an unpreserved issue, the Putative 
Father argues that he preserved in the trial court all 
of the issues that he raises on appeal. The Putative 
Father's brief rnakes the following statement re-
garding preservation: "The issues raised in this 
brief were preserved by appellant's documents filed 
in the district CQurt, including his Petition and Mo-
tion to Intervene, and by the issues discussed by the 
district court in| its Ruling on Motion to Intervene 
and Motion to Dismiss, dated April 17, 
2007."While thk brief does not match record cita-
f. FN 13 
tions with specific issues raised, it does at least reference documents 
should be found. 
wherein the issues 
^ 27 Reviewing! trie documents cited by the Putative 
Father, we conclude that the Putative Father did not 
preserve a due process challenge or an equal pro-
tection challenge. The Natural Father's Objection 
and Motion to (intervene as Respondent raises the 
following arguments: (1) the Putative Father com-
plied with Utahis statute that sets guidelines for out-
of-state putativfe fathers to establish their parental 
rights; and (2) | he complied with the Arizona re-
quirements for putative fathers to establish their 
parental rights. In its ruling, the district court ad-
dressed the following issues: (1) whether the Birth 
Mother's affidavits should be barred, (2) whether 
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full faith and credit should be given to Arizona's 
statement of paternity, and (3) whether the Putative 
Father complied with the Utah requirements for 
out-of-state putative fathers to establish paternity 
rights. It is clear from our review that neither the 
Putative Father's challenges nor the district court's 
rulings consider a due process or equal protection 
challenge. Accordingly, we will not address these 
issues on appeal. 
III. THE PUTATIVE FATHER DID NOT COM-
PLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
CODE SECTION 78-30-4.14 
H 28 Before a putative father may establish the right 
to contest an adoption in Utah, he must meet the re-
quirements outlined in Utah Code section 
78-30-4.14 (Supp.2005). One such requirement is 
that the putative father register with the Utah Office 
of Vital Statistics. ' The statute includes an ex-
ception to this requirement, however, if the follow-
ing circumstances are satisfied: (1) the putative 
father "resides and has resided in another state 
where the unmarried mother was also located or 
resided;" (2) "the mother left that state without no-
tifying or informing the unmarried biological father 
that she could be located in the state of Utah;" (3) 
the putative father "through every reasonable 
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not 
know or have reason to know that the mother is 
residing in the state of Utah;" and (4) the putative 
father "has complied with the most stringent and 
complete requirements of the state where the moth-
er previously resided or was located, in order to 
protect and preserve his parental interest and right 
FN I ^ in the child in cases of adoption." 
*6 K 29 The Putative Father admits that he did not 
comply with the statute's general requirements, but 
he contends that he qualified for the exception. The 
district court ruled that the Putative Father did not 
qualify for the exception because he (1) did not 
comply " 'with the most stringent and complete' " 
Arizona requirements " 'in order to protect and pre-
serve his parental interest and right in the child in 
cases of adoption,' " and (2) he knew or had reason 
to know that the Birth Mother could be located in 
Utah. We address both of the district court's find-
ings in turn. 
A. The Putative Father Failed to Comply with the 
Most Stringent and Complete Arizona Requirements 
[8]U 30 The district court reasoned that the Putative 
Father did not comply with the most stringent and 
complete Arizona requirements established in Ari-
zona Revised Statute section 8-106(G) because he 
did not initiate a paternity action within thirty days 
of receiving notice that the Birth^Mother intended 
to give B.G.S. up for adoption. " An/ona Re-
vised Statute section 8-106(G) provides, in relevant 
part, that each potential father shall be served no-
tice of the planned adoption, and the notice shall in-
form the potential father that his "failure to file a 
paternity action pursuant to title 25, chapter 6, art-
icle 1," x "within thirty days of completion of 
service" of the notice prescribed by this sec-
tion, "bars the potential father from bringing or 
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the 
child."FNf5 
U 31 The Putative Father argues that this language 
does not actually impose any time limits on putat-
ive fathers because the language is couched in 
terms of a requirement that the birth mother include 
the language in her notice to the putative father. He 
further contends that, for policy reasons, the statute 
cannot possibly bar a putative father from establish-
ing paternity at any time, otherwise if the birth 
mother decided not to place the baby for adoption, 
the putative father would be "off the hook for child 
support.'Tinally, he argues that the notice he re-
ceived was ambiguous and therefore did not actu-
ally put him on notice of a mandatory thirty-day 
limit to initiate a paternity action. 
[9]| 10If 11 fil 32 The Putative Father's interpretation 
of the statute is unpersuasive because it produces an 
absurd result and contradicts the plain language of 
the statute. When we interpret a statute, " 'we look 
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its 
meaning.' " ' We read the plain language of a 
statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute 
and with other statutes under the same and related 
FN? 1 
chapters. * " We seek an interpretation that 
renders all parts of a statute "relevant and meaning-
ful, and interpretations are to be avoided which 
render some part of a provision nonsensical or ab-
surd."r* Z~ 
^ 33 Contrary to the Putative Father's contention, it 
would be absurd for the Arizona legislature to re-
quire a birth mother to give a putative father notice 
that he had only thirty days to initiate a paternity 
action but then give the putative father unlimited 
time to initiate the action. Such a result would 
render meaningless the provision in the required 
notice section. Further, the language of section 
8-106 is plain and unambiguously requires a putat-
ive father to initiate a paternity action within thirty 
days of receiving notice of a planned adoption; oth-
erwise, he has no right to contest the adoption. This 
interpretation is not refuted by policy, as the Putat-
ive Father contends. Limiting the time in which a 
putative father may establish the right to contest an 
adoption does not limit the putative father's finan-
cial obligations with respect to that child if the birth 
mother chooses not to place the child for adoption. 
Section 8-106 regards only the right to contest an 
adoption, not any other rights or obligations that a 
putative father may have regarding his child. 
*7 T] 34 The Putative Father's final argument, that 
the notice he received was ambiguous, is incorrect 
and irrelevant. He argues that two paragraphs in the 
notice "contradict each other about whether the 
[Putative Father] must or may initiate a paternity 
proceeding in order to establish interest in the 
child."We hold that the text of the notice was un-
ambiguous. In one place the notice did read that the 
Putative Father "may" initiate a paternity action, 
and, in another place, it stated that the Putative 
Father "must" initiate the action within thirty days 
in order to retain a right to contest the adoption. 
This language te not ambiguous; it simply clarifies 
that it is not necessary for the Putative Father to ini-
tiate a paternity action if he does not desire to do 
so. However, ift he does desire to, then he must do 
so within thirty days. Even if the notice were am-
biguous, the notice included the text of the statute, 
which indicated that the father must initiate a pa-
ternity action within thirty days of receipt of the no-
tice in order to establish the right to contest the ad-
option. Further, when the Putative Father registered 
with the Arizona vital statistics office, he again re-
ceived the text lof the statute. Therefore, the Putat-
ive Father had sufficient notice of the requirement 
to initiate a patdrnity action within thirty days of re-
ceipt of the notibe of a planned adoption. 
\ 35 We uphold the district court's finding that the 
Putative Fathetf failed to comply with the most 
stringent and complete Arizona requirements. The 
Putative Father! failed to initiate a paternity action 
within thirty da^ ys of receiving notice of a planned 
adoption, as required by section 8-106. 
B. The Putative Father Knew or Had Reason to 
Know Tha\t the Birth Mother was in Utah 
[ 12JU 36 The district court reasoned that the Putat-
ive Father knew or had reason to know that the 
Birth Mother was in Utah because, at a protective 
order hearing that was held less than thirty days be-
fore B.G.S. wa$ born, the Birth Mother's attorney 
stated that the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get 
away from [the! Putative Father], and be up there, 
and that's wheife she is." The Putative Father re-
sponded, "Yes^ um [the Birth Mother] told me 
when she mov0d to Utah."We will overturn a dis-
trict court's findings of fact only if they are "clearly 
erroneous." 
[13]K 37 The Ptitative Father argues that he did not 
know that the Birth Mother was in Utah because he 
received an e-mail from the Birth Mother one week 
following the protective order hearing stating that 
she had not mqved to Utah. To discredit the attor-
ney's statement! made at the protective order hear-
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ing, the Putative Father argues, "no reasonable un-
married father, seeking to vindicate his paternity 
rights, would base his actions on the representations 
of the attorney for a woman who has obtained an 
order of protection against him."He also argues that 
he did not know where the Birth Mother was living 
because the protective order prevented him from 
contacting her. 
*8 K 38 Again, the Putative Father's arguments are 
unpersuasive. Utah Code section 78-30-4.14 re-
quires only that a putative father "have reason to 
know" that a birth mother was residing in Utah, not 
that he have actual knowledge. In open court, the 
Putative Father testified that the Birth Mother told 
him that she had moved to Utah. This statement is 
sufficient for the district court to find that the Putat-
ive Father had reason to know that the Birth Mother 
was in Utah. Although the Birth Mother stated a 
week later in an e-mail to the Putative Father that 
she had not moved to Utah, the Putative Father still 
had reason to believe she was in Utah because she 
had previously told him that she was there, her at-
torney told him that she was there, and the Birth 
Mother's statement that she had not "moved" to 
Utah did not necessarily mean that she was not 
staying in Utah until the baby was born and placed 
for adoption. For these reasons, the district court's 
finding that the Putative Father had reason to know 
that the Birth Mother was in Utah is not clearly er-
roneous. 
IV. THE ARIZONA PATERNITY ORDER DOES 
NOT IMPACT THIS CASE BECAUSE IT WAS 
UNTIMELY TO ESTABLISH THE PUTATIVE 
FATHER'S RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ADOP-
TION 
K 39 The Putative Father argues that "the Arizona 
Order of Paternity prevents the adoption of B.G.S. 
without the [Putative Father's] permission" and that 
the district court erred in not giving full faith and 
credit to the paternity order. We hold that the dis-
trict court did err, but the error was harmless be-
cause the Arizona paternity order has no impact on 
the Putative Father's unestablished right to contest 
the adoption. 
A. The District Court Committed Harmless Error 
When It Failed to Give Full Faith and Credit to the 
Arizona Paternity Order 
H 40"Pursuant to the United States Constitution, 
'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records andjudicial Proceed-
ings of every other State.'" *"* Specifically, we 
"give full faith and credit to a declaration of patern-
ity or denial of paternity effective in another state if 
the declaration or denial has been signed and is oth-
erwise in compliance with the law of the other 
state."™26 
[14]U 41 The district court declined to give full 
faith and credit to the Arizona paternity order be-
cause the district court found that "the Arizona 
Court now recognizes that it lacked jurisdiction," 
and "[t]his Court, not the State of Arizona, has ex-
clusive jurisdiction regarding custody of 
[B.G.S. ] . " F N 2 7 
[15]fl6]H 42 As to matters of jurisdiction, a judg-
ment is entitled to full faith and credit "if the same 
issue as to jurisdiction was raised in the foreign 
FN28 
court and adjudicated therein." : In this case, the 
Arizona court did take testimony and consider its 
jurisdiction. The Arizona court stated as follows in 
its order: 
After discussion with the parties present, the 
Court elicits testimony under oath on the record 
in open court that the minor child ... does not 
reside in the state of Arizona and has not resided 
in the state of Arizona for the past six (6) months. 
*9 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1031, this Court does 
not have jurisdiction to determine custody at this 
time. 
(Emphasis added.) 
\ 43 However, the Arizona court did not find that it 
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lacked jurisdiction to issue a paternity order; rather 
the court stated that the Voluntary Petition for Or-
der of Paternity "resolv[es] the paternity issue." 
The court then ordered the matter transferred to 
Utah "for all further proceedings." A lack of juris-
diction as to a custody determination does not 
equate to a lack of jurisdiction as to a paternity de-
termination. A "child custody determination" is 
"any judgment, decree or other order of a court, in-
cluding a permanent, temporary, initial and modi-
fication order, for legal custody, physical custody 
or visitation with respect to a child." A A de-
termination that an individual is the biological fath-
er of a child is not a determination that the biolo-
gical father has custody or visitation rights with re-
spect to that child. Accordingly, the Arizona court 
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine 
custody but not to determine paternity. 
[17][18]Tf 44 Being aware that the Arizona court 
had itself concluded that it had jurisdiction, the 
Utah district court erred in addressing the question 
of whether the Arizona court, in fact, had jurisdic-
tion. However, the error was harmless. " 
'[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently in-
consequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.' 
FNR0 
" '
 w
 In this case, the district court's error in de-
clining to grant the Arizona paternity order full 
faith and credit was harmless because the order has 
no bearing on the Putative Father's right to contest 
the adoption of B.G.S. 
B. The Arizona Paternity Order Has No Impact on 
the Putative Father's Right to Contest the Adoption 
of B.G.S. 
K 45 We hold that a declaration of paternity from 
Arizona does not necessarily establish the right to 
contest an adoption in Arizona. Rather, the right to 
contest an adoption is a more narrow right that must 
be established through specified means. 
\ 46 In Arizona, a putative father must initiate a pa-
ternity action within thirty days of receiving notice 
of the planned adoption in order to establish the 
FN3 I 
right to contest an adoption. * If the putative 
father fails to initiate a paternity action within the 
time specified, then he is barred "from bringing or 
maintaining, any action to assert any interest in the 
child." L ~ "This language is found within the stat-
ute entitled, "Consent to adoption; who shall con-
sent; waiver; cdnsent to the release of information; 
i FN 3 3 
notification to potential fathers." 
[ 19 Jlf 47 The putative Father argues that because 
the Arizona court, having jurisdiction to do so, is-
sued an order declaring him to be B.G.S.'s father, 
he need not mee^ t the thirty-day requirement. This is 
not the case. This interpretation of Arizona law 
would render the thirty-day requirement meaning-
less. Under Arizona law, the right to contest patern-
ity is distinct from the right to contest an adoption. 
A putative father may establish paternity at any 
time, but he may only establish the right to contest 
an adoption if (1) he initiates a paternity action 
within thirty days of receiving notice of a planned 
adoption and (^) that action results in a paternity 
order. 
*10 K 48 Accordingly, we can consistently give full 
faith and credit) to the Arizona paternity order, but 
nevertheless hold that the Putative Father did not 
establish the fight to contest the adoption of 
FN34 B.G.S. * In failing to give the paternity order 
full faith and credit, the district court committed er-
ror. But that error was harmless because the patern-
ity order alone is insufficient to establish the right 
to contest the adoption. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO PfOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEAR-
ING 
[20JH 49 The Putative Father contends that the dis-
trict court erred in finding facts without holding an 
evidentiary heading. 
H 50 Pursuant to rule 43(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure] "[w]hen a motion is based on facts 
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ter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, 
but the court may direct that the matter be heard 
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." 
K 51 In this case, the court provided the parties the 
opportunity to present evidence. On February 2, 
2007, the district court held a hearing on the matter. 
Counsel for the Putative Father requested that the 
matter be argued only on the law and objected to an 
evidentiary argument. The court declined to de-
termine what type of hearing would be held and left 
the matter up to counsel. At the hearing, the parties 
did not present any evidence. The Putative Father 
was present, but his counsel did not call him to 
testify. Subsequently, the court relied on facts in 
the record to make its findings. 
K 52 We hold that the district court did not err in 
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The court 
provided the parties an opportunity to present evid-
ence, but counsel for the Putative Father declined. 
Further, the court relied only on facts in the record 
to make its findings. 
VI. THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S APPEAL IS NOT 
FRIVOLOUS 
TJ 53 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putative 
Father's "appeal is frivolous as it is not groun-
ded."The Adoptive Parents base their argument on 
the following claims: (1) the Putative Father's claim 
is moot because he only challenged one of two dis-
positive orders; (2) the Putative Father makes argu-
ments on appeal that he failed to preserve; (3) the 
Putative Father challenges findings of fact without 
fully marshaling the evidence that supports those 
findings; (4) the Putative Father ignores the essen-
tial fact he admitted to the court at the protective 
order hearing-that he knew the Birth Mother went 
to Utah; and (5) the Putative Father challenges the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing when it was counsel 
for the Putative Father who declined an evidentiary 
hearing. 
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[21]^] 54 The Adoptive Parents' arguments fail to 
establish that the Putative Father filed a frivolous 
claim. A frivolous claim under rule 33(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure"is one that is 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, 
or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law."We address each 
of the Adoptive Parents' arguments in turn. 
*11 Tf 55 First, the Putative Father did challenge the 
substance of both the Motion to Strike and the Mo-
tion to Dismiss, therefore his claim is not moot. 
Second, although the Putative Father failed to pre-
serve two of the issues that he raises on appeal, he 
still raises other issues that are properly before us 
for consideration. Third, the Adoptive Parents have 
not developed a marshaling argument, and failure 
to marshal is not included in rule 33(b)'s definition 
of a frivolous appeal. Fourth, the Putative Father 
has admitted that he stated at the protective order 
hearing that he knew, at the time, that the Birth 
Mother was in Utah. He contends, however, that he 
did not know or have reason to know the Birth 
Mother was actually in Utah because following the 
protective order hearing the Birth Mother sent him 
an e-mail wherein she stated that she had not 
moved to Utah. While this may not be a strong ar-
gument, it does not appear to be a bad faith argu-
ment, especially in light of the fact that the Putative 
Father has submitted the e-mail for the court's re-
view. 
f 56 Finally, the Putative Father's challenge to the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing does not appear to be 
made in bad faith. The Putative Father contends 
that the district court ruled on facts that the Putative 
Father did not know were in dispute. Particularly, 
the district court found that the copy of the Arizona 
Paternity Order submitted by the Putative Father 
was not properly certified. The Putative Father ar-
gues on appeal that the district court should have 
provided him an opportunity to submit evidence re-
garding the validity of the Order before the court 
ruled on the Order. This appears to be a good faith 
argument, although it is irrelevant because, as we 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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have stated earlier, the validity of the order has no 
bearing on the outcome of the case. 
U 57 Accordingly, we hold that the Putative Father's 
appeal is not frivolous, even though we uphold the 
district court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
*h 58 We affirm the district court's decision. Spe-
cifically, we hold that (1) the appeal is not moot be-
cause the Putative Father challenged the substance 
of the two motions; (2) the due process issue and 
the equal protection issue are not properly before us 
because the Putative Father failed to preserve them; 
(3) the Putative Father failed to comply with Utah 
Code section 78-30-4.14; (4) the district court com-
mitted harmless error when it declined to give the 
Arizona Paternity Order full faith and credit; (5) the 
district court provided the opportunity for an evid-
entiary hearing; and, finally, (6) the Putative Fath-
er's appeal is not frivolous. 
H 59 Affirmed. 
U 60 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS, 
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in 
Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion. 
FNi. At first blush, these statements ap-
pear contradictory-the natural father is un-
known, yet he received actual notice of the 
Birth Mother's move to Utah. They are re-
concilable, however. Because the Birth 
Mother was having sexual relations with 
two different men around the time she be-
came pregnant, she was unsure which man 
was the natural father. Because she gave 
both men actual notice of her move to 
Utah, it is accurate to state that the 
"unknown" father received "actual" notice 
of the Birth Mother's move to Utah. 
FN2. 2008 UT App 152, 184 P.3d 1239. 
FN3.W.1110. 
FN4. Reck v. State, 2008 UT 39, % 7, 191 
P.3d 4. 
FN5. (ilew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 
f 18, 1B1 P.3d791. 
FN6. In re Adoption of S.L.F., 2001 UT 
App 183,19, 27 P.3d 583. 
FN7. This statute has been renumbered and 
revised since the proceedings of this case. 
Throughout this opinion, we apply the 
2005 version of the statute. 
FN8. 
409, 4 
al 
Mad ::k v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 
0 (Utah 1982) (citations and intern-
quofetion marks omitted). 
FN9. the Adoptive Parents claim that the 
Putative Father falsely asserted that he did 
not know that the Birth Mother was in 
Utah when in fact he did know she was in 
Utah. 
FNlO.Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B) 
(2008) 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 17, 192 
867 (emphasis omitted) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN 11. 
P.3d 
issue 
FN12. 
serve 
the 
lishes 
plain 
exist, 
pellant[ 
ance 
issue.' 
marks 
hi f 19 ("When a party fails to pre-
4n issue for appeal, we will address 
only if (1) the appellant estab-
that the district court committed 
irror, (2) exceptional circumstances 
pr (3) in some situations, if the ap-
raises a claim of ineffective assist-
counsel in failing to preserve the 
[(citation and internal quotation 
lomitted)). 
Of 
FN13.|The record citation is not at all help-
ful because it encompasses the entire re-
cord. 
FNH.ptah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. U$ Gov. Works. 
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FN15.A/.§78-30-4.15(4)(aKd). 
FN16.Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 8-106(G) (2005). 
FNJ7.M §8-106(G)(7). 
FN18.A/. § 8-106(G)(3) (emphasis added). 
FN19JW. § 8-106(G)(7); see also id § 
8-106(I)(8) (suggesting that the birth moth-
er include the following language in the 
notice to the putative father: "If you do not 
file a paternity action under title 25, 
chapter 6, article 1, Arizona Revised Stat-
utes, and do not serve the mother within 
thirty days after completion of the service 
of this notice and pursue the action to 
judgment, you cannot bring or maintain 
any action to assert any interest in the 
child.")-
FN20. Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 
70, «[ 35, 194 P.3d 956 (quoting State v. 
Gallegos. 2007 LT 81, % 12, 171 P.3d 
426). 
FN21.A/. 
FN22. Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, 
LLC, 2008 UT 21. «[ 9, 182 P.3d 333 
(citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
FN23.Section 8-106 is entitled, "Consent 
to adoption; who shall consent; waiver; 
consent to the release of information; noti-
fication to potential fathers." 
FN24. Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 
56,«[18, 181 P.3d791. 
FN25. Mori v Mori, 931 P.2d 854, 856 
(Utah 1997) (quoting U.S. Const, art. IV, § 
1). 
FN26.Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-310 
(2008). 
FN27. The district court also found two 
more problems with the order. 
First, the court found that the order was 
a "nullity" because it was issued after 
the Birth Mother relinquished her rights 
to B.G.S., and, accordingly the Putative 
Father lost any right to contest the adop-
tion. We agree. The paternity order was 
a "nullity" as it pertains to whether the 
Putative Father may contest the adoption 
of B.G.S. However, that determination 
does not mean that we decline to give 
the order full faith and credit. As our 
analysis indicates, the right to establish 
paternity is a separate and distinct right 
from the right to contest an adoption. 
The establishment of paternity is only 
one of many requirements that a putative 
father must satisfy before he establishes 
the right to contest an adoption. In this 
case, the Putative Father failed to meet 
the additional requirements, therefore it 
is irrelevant whether he was able to es-
tablish paternity. 
Second, the district court stated that the 
order does not "solicit [ ] judicial confid-
ence" for a myriad of technical reasons. 
Specifically, the court was concerned 
that the order was not executed by a 
judge; the copy provided to the Utah 
court was not certified; the copy was 
handwritten by the Birth Mother; and the 
order was amended by the Arizona court, 
but the Putative Father failed to present 
the amended order to the district court. 
None of the reasons stated by the district 
court is supported by evidence that the 
order failed to comply with Arizona law, 
which is the only requirement we must 
consider in a full faith and credit analys-
is.Rule 58(a) of the Arizona Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires only that, "all 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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judgments shall be in writing and signed 
by a judge or a court commissioner duly 
authorized to do so.'The Paternity Order 
in this case was in writing and signed by 
the deputy clerk. No one has argued that 
a deputy clerk is not authorized to sign 
an order. Further, no other Arizona re-
quirements have been brought before us. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Ari-
zona requirements have been met. 
FN28. In re Complaint Against Smith, 925 
P.2d 169, 172 (Utah 1996) (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
FN29.Ariz.Rev.Stat. 
(Supp.2008). 
25-1002(3)(a) 
The Adoptive Parents look to Arizona 
Revised Statute sections 25-1031 and 
25-1002 to argue that the Arizona court 
lacked jurisdiction to issue the paternity 
order. Section 25-1031(A)(l)-(2) states 
that Arizona does not have jurisdiction 
to "make an initial child custody determ-
ination" unless Arizona is the child's 
home state, and a court of another state 
does not have jurisdiction over the child. 
Section 25-1002(4) defines "child cus-
tody proceeding" as "a proceeding, in-
cluding a proceeding for divorce, separa-
tion, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardi-
anship, paternity, termination of parental 
rights and protection from domestic viol-
ence, in which legal custody, physical 
custody or visitation with respect to a 
child is an issue or in which that issue 
may appear."(Emrjhasis added."! Thus, 
the adoptive parents argue that when the 
Arizona court stated that it lacked juris-
diction to determine custody, it was also 
stating that it lacked jurisdiction to adju-
dicate paternity because a custody pro-
ceeding is statutorily equivalent to a pa-
ternity proceeding. However, the juris-
dictional statute regards a "child custody 
determination," not a proceeding. Ar-
iz.Rey.Stat. § 25-1031(A). Further, the 
definition of a "child custody determina-
tion" Idoes not incorporate a paternity de-
termination: a child custody determina-
tion is "any judgment, decree or other 
order | of a court, including a permanent, 
temporary, initial and modification or-
der, for legal custody, physical custody 
or visitation with respect to a child."/<i§ 
25-1002(3)(a). Therefore, a lack of juris-
diction over a custody determination 
does not equate to a lack of jurisdiction 
over a| paternity determination. 
FN30. State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 24, 
152 P.Bd 315 (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Evans. 2001 UT 22, % 20, 
FN31.AHz.Rev.Stat. § 8-106(G)(3) (2005). 
FN32.M § 8-106(G)(6). 
FN33./4 §8-106. 
FN34. This situation should not arise in 
Utah because here, "a declaration of pa-
ternity may not be signed or filed after 
consent to or relinquishment for adoption 
has been signed.'TJtah Code Ann. § 
78B-15-302(8) (2008). 
Utah,2009. 
H.U.F. v. W.P.WL 
--- P.3d —, 20<ta WL 304711 (Utah), 623 Utah 
Adv. Rep-14, 2069 UT 10 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Ofig- US Gk>v. Works. 
ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
'TAN APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 2 h 2009 
Young Living Essential Oils, 
LC, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Carlos Marin, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not Fori Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080624-CA 
F I L E D 
( S e p t e m b e r 24, 2 0 09] 
^009~UT App 272} 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 06040223f7 
The Honorable Samuel D. M-cVey 
Attorneys: Scott B. Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Barnard N. Madsen and Scott D. preston, Provo, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Thome, Orme, and McHugh, 
McHUGH, Judge: 
from the trial court's order granting 
n favor of Young jLiving Essential Oils, 
parties' contract 
"in 
the 
Carlos Marin appeal 
partial summary judgment 
LC (Young Living). Marin had defaulted on 
by failing to meet certain "performance guarantees" detailed 
the agreement. On appeal, Marin argues that the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of 
Marin also contests the trial court's award! of 
costs to Young Living. We affirm. 
Young Living, 
attorney fees and 
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of 
correctness, and views the facts and all 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
party." Qrvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, i 6 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
summary judgment for 
reasonable inferences 
to the nonmoving 
1177 P. 3d 600 (citation 
On appeal, Marin does not deny that he 
performance guarantees contained in the cqnfc 
claims that the trial court erred in granti 
because there was a material issue of fact 
Young Living breached its obligation of goofci 
failed to meet the 
:ract. Rather, Marin 
hg summary judgment 
[relating to whether 
faith and fair 
dealing. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that a 
grant of summary judgment is proper where "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact"). In support of this claim, Marin 
relies on an affidavit he submitted in opposition to Young 
Living's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In his affidavit, 
Marin avers that Young Living failed "to provide him with the 
marketing tools [that] were necessary for him to satisfy his 
performance guarantees." Young Living counters that Marin's 
affidavit cannot raise a material issue of fact because it 
constitutes parol evidence offered to insert additional terms 
into the parties' written agreement. 
The parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud 
or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract." Tancrren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20, 1 11, 182 P.3d 326 (emphasis and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Thus, if a contract is integrated, parol evidence is 
admissible only to clarify ambiguous terms . . . ." Id. In 
determining the admissibility of parol evidence the court must 
begin by "determining] whether the agreement is integrated." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
An integrated agreement is "a writing . . . constituting a 
final expression of one or more terms of an agreement. " Id. ^ 12 
(internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen parties have reduced 
to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, 
it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that 
the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the 
parties." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that "we will not allow extrinsic 
evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the question 
of integration in the face of a clear integration clause." Id. 
1 16. 
Here, the agreement signed by the parties includes a 
provision titled "Entire Agreement," which reads, in part, 
This Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the Parties hereto 
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and 
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous 
agreements and understandings of the Parties, 
and there are no representations, warranties, 
or other agreements between the Parties in 
connection with the subject matter hereof 
except as specifically set forth herein. 
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Thus, Marin's agreement with Young Living was integrated because 
the parties signed a written contract including a clear 
integration clause. See id. Furthermore, Marin makes no claim 
that the language of the agreement was ambiguous. Therefore, the 
parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to 
vary or add terms to the parties' integrated agreement. See id. 
1 18. 
Marin argues that the parol evidence rule does not prohibit 
the introduction of evidence that Young Living breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Marin reasons 
that "[b]ecause the covenant was already part of the contract at 
issue[,] . . . [his] testimony in support of his claim for breach 
of the covenant was not 'offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of1 the contract." "While a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inheres in almost evjery contract, . . . 
this covenant cannot be read to establish r^ ew, independent rights 
or duties to which the parties did not agre|e ex ante." Qakwood 
Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,! K 45, 104 P.3d 1226. 
Rather, the covenant is "implied in contracts to protect the 
express covenants and promises of the contract." Seare v. 
University of Utah Sch. of Med., 882 P.2d 673, 678 (Utah Ct, App. 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Marin reasons that Young Living breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing because it failed to provide him 
promised marketing tools, but no obligation regarding marketing 
tools was made part of the written agreement. Therefore, we 
reject Marin's argument that the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing can be used to incorporate extrinsic evidence of 
a contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties1 agreement 
was integrated and the alleged oral agreement was not part of 
"the express covenants and promises of the icontract." Id._ 
Finally, Marin contests the trial court's award of attorney 
fees and costs to Young Living. Young Livifrg counters that Marin 
waived his arguments on attorney fees and cpsts on appeal because 
his objection was not timely filed in the ttrial court. "To 
preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised a 
timely and specific objection before the trial court. We will 
not address an issue if it is not preserved! or if the appellant 
has not established other grounds for seeking review." H.U.F. v. 
W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, H 25, 203 P.3d 943 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure instructs 
that " [objections to [a] proposed order shall be filed within 
five days after service." Utah R, Civ, P. 7(f)(2)- Young Living 
served its Proposed Final Judgment and Affidavit of Attorney[] 
Fees and Costs on May 27, 2008. Marin then had five days as 
20080624-CA 3 
provided by rule 7(f) (2), see id,, along with an additional three 
days following service by mail, see id. R, 6(e), to file his 
objection. Marin's objection was not filed until June 11, 2008, 
making it untimely, and his arguments, therefore, are waived on 
appeal.l 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
CarolynC/B. McHugh, Judge(^ 
WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregorjf^.^Orme, Judge 
1. Marin argues that exceptional circumstances warrant our 
consideration of his arguments as to attorney fees and costs 
because during the course of the litigation Young Living also 
failed to comply with filing deadlines. However, Young Living's 
failings do not excuse Marin's untimely filing. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111) 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)942-7048 
Facsimile: (801)942-7047 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UtTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL * 
OILS, LC, * AFFIDAVIT OF CARLOS MARIN 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
CARLOS MARIN, * Case No. 060402237 
* 
Defendant* * Honorable Samuel D. McVey 
* * * * 
Carlos Marin, having been first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am the defendant in this action and! I make this 
affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and belief* 
2, I was not required to purchase the product which 
plaintiff provided to me. In accordance witft paragraph 4,3 of 
the Field Advisor to Executive Board Distributor Agreement at 
issue in this case (hereinafter the "Agreement:") , the product was 
nto be used for samples in attracting new Distributor/Leaders." 
IT: was never intended by either plaintiff or myself that I would 
be obligated to pay for these "samples." 
1 
3. Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and selling 
therapeutic grade essential oils and wellness supplements. 
Historically, plaintiff has sold its products through a network 
of individuals who are for the most part practitioners of 
alternative medicine, massage therapists, and quasi-naturopath 
non-licensed wellness enthusiasts. When plaintiff's 
representataves first contacted me, they represented to me thai: 
they desired to increase their company's sales volume using a 
mainstream network marketing model, i.e., marketing their 
products through traditional network marketing sales 
representatives directly to the individual consumer. Plaintiff's 
representatives were aware of the fact that I had previously 
built a globa] network of more than 500,000 distributors for 
Amway Corporation using a mainstream network marketing model. 
4. In order to induce me to enter into the Agreement, 
plaintiff represented to me that it was Hearing completion of a 
new mainstream marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio CD, and 
other marketing materials (hereinafter referred to as the 
''marketing tools") . It was clearly understood by both plaintiff 
and myself that these marketing tools would oe absolutely 
necessary in order for me to be able to meet my performance 
guarantees under the Agreement and it was represented to me that 
they would be available for use by February 1, 2005. No 
experienced leader in this industry would agree to these 
2 
performance guarantees without having these marketing tools. 
5. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeattedly promised to do 
so, plaintiff failed to provide me with any d>f the necessary 
marketing tools (except for one mediocre but expensive brochure 
which my distributors were not interested in purchasing). After 
plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools by February 1, 
2005, as promised, I spent more than a month working on my own 
and in conjunction with the third party vendor hired by 
plaintiff, Rainmaker Consulting Group, in ordier expedite the 
delivery of the marketing tools. I wrote mote than 20 marketing 
and training scripts for video and web based content. On two 
occasions, I traveled to St. Augustine, Florida to work with 
Rainmaker Consulting shooting marketing videos. To my knowledge, 
the videos have never been completed. 
6. It was only based upon plaintiff's representations and 
our mutual understanding that these marketing tools were almost 
ready and would be provided in a timely manner, that I agreed to 
the performance guarantees contained in paragraph 3.4 of the 
Agreement. Without the marketing tools there was virtually no 
possibility that I could have met the performance guarantees. 
7. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to 
provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary Young, 
plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David Stirling, 
plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with my growing concerns 
3 
about my ability to meet the performance guarantees. Mr. Young 
and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to 
perform as promised, assured me that my inability to satisfy the 
performance guarantees would not affect my receipt of the advance 
payment of $25,000 due February 15, 2005, and expressed their 
confidence that the marketing tools would be ready for my use by 
mid-February to early March 2005. 
8. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, plaintiff's 
Chief Financial Officer, informed me that due to my failure to 
meet the March 15, 2005 performance guarantee, plaintiff was 
considering withholding further payment to me under the 
Agreement, In response, I made it very clear to Mr* Bentley rhat 
my failure to satisfy the performance guarantee was the 
unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure to provide the promised 
marketing tools, that I could and would meet my performance 
guarantees when the tools were provided, and that I expected 
plaintiff to continue making payment to me in accordance with the 
terms of the Agreement. Mr. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff 
had failed to perform as promised, represented that plaintiff 
anticipated that its website would be completed within 
approximately two weeks, and stated that plaintiff would be 
making a partial $15,000 payment to me. 
9. On April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary Young 
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools. 
4 
Mr. Young responded by telling me that he would xxget to the 
bottom" of the problem and see what he could do. 
10, Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to provide 
me with the marketing tools which I needed to do my job, and 
despite its requests that I remain patient while it continued in 
its efforts to provide the marketing tools, plaintiff failed to 
pay me $10,000 of the advance payment due March 15, 2005 in 
accordance with paragraph 4 of the Agreement and failed to make 
any of the $25,000 advance payment due to be paid to me on April 
15, 2005. 
11. On April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling regarding 
plaintiff's failure to provide the promised marketing tools. Mr. 
Stirling again assured me that they would be provided soon and 
again requested my patience, 
12. On May 3, 2007, Mr, Stirling notified me that he had 
received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., "John's 
folks) '"which indicated they are making progress" on the website. 
Mr. Stirling asked me to '"hold tight", A copy of the e-mail is 
attached hereto. Thus, 49 days after plaintiff stopped making 
payments to me in accordance with the Agreement, plaintiff 
acknowledged that it had still not provided me with the marketing 
tools which were absolutely essential for me to be able to do my 
job and again requested my continued patiencei, 
13, On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not 
5 
MAR-31-2QQ7 Q5J30 FH SCOTT B tttTCHELL 8019427047 P.07/07 
provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in order to do 
my job, 1 spoke with Mr, Youngr *nd informed him that I believed I 
VuH hxmn patient long enough in waiting for the repeatedly 
promised marketing tool* and that I could no longer afford to 
continue to my contractual relationship with plaintiff* 
2007, 
Carloa Maris 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me th is k ^ d a y of 
My coiamlMion expires: 
> • » mi l S\ i * #1111^1 ufl* dfriflW*" 
KIY1NMAUfi9CE5MfTH 
My Commfotfon ***** 
Undersigned/testifies that a copy of the foreaoino was 
served this iZ^^&LW of April 2007 via first class U,S, Hail, 
postage prapald/^addraasad as follows; 
Barnard N. Madsen 
Trent M. Sutton 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 N. University Avenue 
Pravo, Utah 84604 
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ADDENDUM 4 
FIELD ADVISOR TO EXECUTIVE BOARD DISTRIBUTOR AGREEMENT 
This Agreement entered into on t f a i s / ^ ^ d a y of January, 2005 (the "Effective Date") by 
and between Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Company") with its principal place of business 
located at 3215 West Executive Parkway, Lehi, Utah 84043 and Carlos Marin^'MARIN^) with 
his principal place of business located at Miami, Florida (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"Parties"). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, "Company" develops and sells proprietary nutritional supplements, essential oils and 
personal care products ("Products") through a network marketing system throughout the World through a 
network of independent distributors referred to herein as Distributors ("Distributors"); 
WHEREAS, MARIN has proposed becoming a Distributor/Leaderi with sponsorship directly by 
John Terhune who has a similar agreement with Company; and 
WHEREAS, MARIN has significant experience as a Distributor/Leader and through affiliations 
with John Terhune, in being part of quality motivational and training materials; 
WHEREAS, Company is desirous of assisting MARIN in devotingjall his time and attention into 
recruiting additional distributors underneath him and training them; 
WHEREAS, MARIN also has numerous contacts with potential Distributor/Leaders who MARIN 
can bring to the Company and sign as new distributors with the Compan}'; 
NOW THEREFORE, for the mutual promises exchanged herein and for other good and valuable 
consideration,, the receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged and agreed herein, the Parties agree as 
follows: 
1. Incorporation of Recitals, 
The recitals set forth above are hereby incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
2. Term. 
The term of this Agreement shall commence as of the Effective Dat£ and shall continue for a period 
indefinite from the Effective Date. 
3. Duties & Responsibilities of Distributor. 
3.1 MARIN will become a new Distributor by signing a current Distributor application and be 
bound by Company's current Policies and Procedures, as amended from time to time. 
3.2 MARIN shall recruit additional Distributor/Leaders in an attempt to build his organization 
extending his host efforts, time and talent to do so. 
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3.3 MARIN shall devote his fiill time and attention beginning at execution of this agreement to 
recruiting new Distributor/Leaders. 
3.4 MARIN will meet the following performance guarantees: 
3.4.1 S5000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by February 15th, 2005 
$30,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by March 15Ui3 2005 
5100,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by April 15th, 2005 
$300,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by May 15^, 2005 
$600,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by June 15th, 2005 
£900,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by July 15 '^, 2005 
3.5 MARIN will use his best efforts to attract and sign with Company new Distributor/Leaders. 
3.6 MARIN shall abide by the Company's Policies and Procedures, as amended from time to time, 
while he maintains his distributorship with the Company. 
4. Compensation. 
MARIN shall be paid compensation for monthly downline sales pursuant to the current Company 
compensation plan as amended from time to time. 
As additional compensation for services rendered under this Agreement, the Parties agree to the 
structure of a Fast Cash Program and a Founders Share Program, both of which are explained below. 
There will be certain minimum payments which will be advanced to MARIN according to the 
following schedule; 
S 25,000.00 due upon execution of this Agreement; 
? 7^000.00 due February 15, 2005; 
S 25,000.00 due March 15, 2005; 
$ 25,000.00 due April 15, 2005; for a total expenditure of $ 100,000.00 
These monies advanced to MARIN will be offset by any payments due MARIN under the Fast Cash 
Program as calculated below. Also, these payments will be offset by any commission payments due 
MARIN each month as calculated by the standard commission payout plan. For example, if 
Company owes MARIN $3,000.00 by March 15, 2005 for commissions, Company will pay MARIN 
$25,000.00 on the following April 5, 2005 date as a minimum guaranteed payment The $22,000.00 
difference will be a credit balance Company will maintain over the course of the agreement to be 
used to offset future Fast Cash Program payments or future commission run payments. As another 
example, if the commission run for April 2005 exceeded the minimum guaranteed payment and 
there were no accumulated credit balances, MARIN would receive the larger amount due under the 
commission plan payout. If any of the advanced amounts are not repaid by the commission payouts 
or Fast Cash at the end of the guaranteed payments, these amounts will be deducted from an}' future 
commission payout that exceeds $25,000.00 until these advanced amounts arc paid in full (i.e., 
TvIARIN will receive the Commission payout up to $25,000.00 but anything over this amount will be 
used to repay any unpaid advances until paid in full). 
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4.1 Fast Cash Program 
On May 5, 2005, a snapshot of the most recent month's bonusirun will be taken of MARIN *s 
organization. 
a. MARIN will be paid $1,500.00 each for up to 10 first level distributors (not to 
exceed $15,000.00) who have signed on with Company, have Group Volume of greater than 
$20,000.00 each and are on autoship. 
b. MARIN will be paid $1,000.00 each for up to ] 001 second level distributors (ten. 
each for the Distributor named in (a) above, not to exceed SI00,000.00 total payout) who 
have signed on with Company, have Croup Volume of greater than $5,000.00 each and are 
on autoship. 
This plan is intended to entice MARIN to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary 
time to it. Also, it will provide him with a quick resource of cash to ouild the business. The total 
payout, based on MARIN's structure as shown on the bonus calculation described above, will not 
exceed SI 15,000.00 and will be used first as an offset for any advanced payments made that exceed 
the amounts paid by Company under the standard commission payment p]m made to that date. 
42 Founders' Shares 
The purpose of this special bonus, above and beyond the compensation plan, is to provide an 
incentive for MARIN to use to recruit the best Distributors/Leaders to join the Company on 
his first level. It will allow MARIN to offer this special bonus to those who will go the extra 
mile and meet criteria set out below, 
a, By May 1,2005, MARIN will designate 10 first-Ihjte distributors and 50 second lint 
distributors who will participate in this program. These 10 first-level Distributors and 50 
second-level distributors (no more than 10 per first-level distributors and no more than 50 
second-level distributors) who will participate in this program will be entitled to a 
"Founder's Share" consisting of a percentage of each distributor's organizational Group 
Volume (infinite) as follows: 
i. MARIN =0.40 of GV 
ii. Top 10 (first-level to MARIN) = 030% of GV 
iii. Top 50 (5 first level to each Top 10) = p.30% of GV 
b. Each participating distributor's Founder's Share is earned as follows: 
i. A distributor is entitled to accrue a payment of one-third of their Founder's 
Share upon achieving "Diamond" (or first level Diamond) status, two-thirds upon 
achieving "Crown Diamond" (or second level Diamond) status, and full payment 
upon achieving "Hope Diamond" (or third level Diamond) status. 
ii. If a Distributor fails to qualify in any month under the compensation plan as 
Diamond, Crown Diamond or Hope Diamond as described above, that distributor 
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will not be entitled to accrue any Founder's Share payment for that month according 
to this plan. In addition, the Distributor will only be entitled to accrue a payment 
for the level the distributorship is currently at for that month, even if that Distributor 
had previously attained a higher level in a prior month level (e.g., a Diamond will 
only be entitled to accrue a one-third share payment even if that Distributorship 
previously qualified as a Crown Diamond). When a Distributor meets the described 
qualifications, that Distributor will accrue the Founder's Share entitlement. The 
Company will pay The Founder's Share Program payments to each qualified 
Distributor who has accrued an entitlement at the end of each calendar year. 
iti. A Founder's Share is unique to MARIN or to the individual initially named 
by MARIN in this program and cannot be sold, devised, given, bequeathed, 
distributed or in any manner transferred to any other person or entity, even if the 
Distributorship is in the name of an entity. A Share cannot be awarded in a divorce 
action or it becomes null and void. The Founder's Shares are unique personal 
service agreements and are entered into between the Company and the individuals 
named in accordance with subparagraph V of this section. 
iv. A Founder's Shares is a unique personal services contract and is not a 
property right or an equity share. Should anyone entitled to a Founder's Share 
attempt to transfer said share, retire, transfer the distributorship, suffer incapacity, or 
death, it will constitute a complete termination of all participation in the program. 
Said Founder's Share becomes null and void as to all parties and no further 
payments will be made pursuant to that particular agreement. 
4 3 Product Entitlement 
MARIN shall be entitled to a product credit of $5,000.00 for January 2005 and $5,000.00 for 
February 2005. This product credit is to be used for samples in attracting new 
Distributor/Leaders and expires at the end of each month in which it is granted. This credit 
does not count towards product purchase requirements for qualification purposes. 
5- Confidential information. 
5.1 The Parties recognize that each may disclose to the other, certain confidential information, as 
herein, that is considered a valuable trade secret or proprietary of the disclosing party. The 
Parties specifically agree that each will not at any time, during or after the term of this 
Agreement, in any manner, either directly or indirectly, use, divulge, disclose, or communicate 
to any person, firm, or corporation, any confidential information of any kind, nature, or 
Description concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business of the other 
(hereinafter referred to as "Confidential Information")-
5.2 Confidential Information which may or may not be disclosed during the performance of this 
Agreement also includes but is not limited to: "Company" genealogies (being the information 
held by Company related to its Distributors, including without limitation its relationship with 
each of its Distributors, the sponsoring of each Distributor, the Distributor's upline and 
downline, charts, data reports, names,, addresses and telephone numbers and other identification 
materials pertaining to the same, historical purchasing information for each Distributor), 
proprietary product information which may from time-to~tixne be made known to MARIN, 
product formulations and ingredients, the names, buying habits, or practices of any Company 
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customers or Distributors; Company marketing methods and related data; the names of 
Company's vendors or suppliers; costs of materials; costs of its Products generally, the prices 
Company obtains or has obtained or at which it sells or has sold its Products or services; 
manufacturing and sales costs; lists or other written records used in Company's business; 
compensation paid to its Distributors and employees and other terms of consultancy thereof; 
manufacturing processes; scientific studies or analyses other than those published for use by 
Company for the benefit of its Distributors, details of training methods, new products or new 
uses for old products, merchandising or sales techniques, contracts and licenses, business 
systems, computer programs, or any other confidential information of, about, or concerning the 
business of Company; its manner of operation or other confidential data of any kind, nature or 
description. 
5.3 The term "Confidential Information" shall also include information conveyed orally unless the 
party disclosing the oral information notifies the other party that such information is not 
confidential and is not subject to this Agreement. 
5 4 The term ''Confidential Information" does not include information thai fa) is or becomes 
generally available to the public through no fault of the receiving party, (b) was known to the 
receiving party prior to its nondisclosure hereunder, as demonstrated by files in existence at the 
time of the disclosure, (c) becomes known to the receiving party, without restriction, from a 
source other than the disclosing party, without breach of this Agreement by the receiving party 
and otherwise not in violation of the disclosing party's rights, or (d) is explicitly approved for 
release by written authorization of the disclosing party. 
5.5 The Parties agree that each shall turn over to the other all equipment, notebooks, documents, 
memoranda, reports, notes, files, sample books, correspondence, lists, other written and graphic 
records, and the like, affecting or relating to the business of the other, which is used to prepare, 
construct, possess, control or otherwise come into the other's possession during the term of this 
Agreement concerning any process, apparatus or products manufactured, sold, used, developed, 
investigated or considered by the other concerning the Confidential information or concerning 
any other business or activity of the other shall remain at ail times the property,' of disclosing 
party and shall be delivered to disclosing party upon termination of this Agreement for any 
reason or at ar>y time upon request. 
5.6 MARIN agrees that, during the term of this Agreement or upon termination thereof, and if 
requested by Company to do so, MARIN will sign an appropriMe list of any and all Confidential 
Information of Company of which MARIN has knowledge or about which MARIN has acquired 
information. All personnel, both contract and employees, representatives, agents and assigns 
thereof affiliated with MARIN with access to Confidential Information as described hereunder 
shall be admonished by MARIN regarding the requirement for confidentiality of the same. 
5.7 The Parties agree that, as between them, all Confidential Infonrftation is important, material, 
trade secret, highly sensitive and valuable to the other's business and its goodwill and is 
transmitted to the other in strictest confidence. 
5.2 In the event of breach or threatened breach of this Section by ejther Party, the non-breaching 
party will be entitled to an injunction restraining the other party from disclosing, in whole or in 
part, any Confidential Information to any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity to 
whom the non-breaching party's Confidential Information, in whole or in part, has been 
disclosed or threatened to be disclosed. Nothing contained herein will be construed as limiting 
the non-bneaching party from, or prohibiting the non-breacfaing party from, pursuing any other 
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remedies available to it for such breach, or threatened breach, including recovery of damages 
from the breaching part}'. 
All provisions of Section 5, including any and all sub-secrions thereof, shall survive ti^e termination 
or expiration of this Agreement 
Indemnification. 
6.3 MARIN hereby agrees to indemnify and save Company and hold Company harmless In respect 
of all causes of action, liabilities, costs, charges and expenses, loss and damage (including 
consequential loss) suffered or incurred by Company (including legal fees) arising from any 
willful or grossly negligent act or omission of MARIN or his employees, servants and agents or 
arising from contravention by MARIN of any of its employees, servants, and agents of any of 
the terms and conditions imposed on MARJN pursuant to this Agreement. 
6.2 Company hereby agrees to indemnify and save MARIN and hold MARftf hannless in respeci of 
all causes of actions, liabilities, costs, charges and expenses, loss and damage suffered or 
incurred by MARIN (including legal fees) arising from any willful or grossly negligent act or 
omission of Company or its employees, servants and agents and arising from contravention by 
Company of any of its employees, servants, and agents of any of the terms and conditions 
imposed on Company pursuant to this Agreement. 
6.3 No party shall be liable to any other party hereunder for any claim covered by insurance, except 
to the extent that the liability of such party exceeds the amount of such insurance coverage. 
Nothing in this clause 6.3 shall be construed to reduce insurance coverage to which any party 
may otherwise be entitled. 
Representations. 
7.1 MARIN has obtained all licenses, permits and other requisite authorizations and has taken 
all actions required by applicable laws or governmental regulations in connection with its 
business as now condi^-ted-
7.2 Each of MARIN's employees, consulting and professional personnel assigned to perform the 
Services as contemplated hereunder shall have the proper skill, training and background so 
as to be able to perform the services in a competent and professional manner and all work 
shall be so performed. 
7.3 MARJN represents that it is a business in good standing and that its relationship with its 
suppliers and customers is good. 
1A MARIN represents that he has successful, favorable experience in providing Services such 
as the duties as contemplated herein. 
Default and Termination. 
8.1 Cure 
In the event any Party to this Agreement shall fail to timely perform or keep any undertaking to 
which it has agreed herein, then the other party may, upon ten (10) days notice in writing, 
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during which period the party against whom such default is contended may cure such 
contended default without affecting any other provision of thfs Agreement, after which, if such 
default has not been cured, such party may, should it so electj terminate this Agreement and sue 
for damages. 
8.2 The present Agreement shall remain binding on each of the parties regardless of any iransfer of 
shares in the capital stock of either party (whether as betweep existing shareholders, to related 
shareholders or to new shareholders or any combination thereof), de facto or de jure change of 
conrrol of either party, amalgamation with one or more corporations, restructuring of the capital 
stock of either part)' or other corporate reorganization of either party, 
8.3 The occurrence of any one or more of the following events shall entitle Company to terminate 
this Agreement (i) without further notice to MARIN where the default raised cannot possibly be 
cured, or (ii) within ten (10) days of the receipt of written notice of such event where the default 
in question has not been cured, or (iii) at events which list a 4ate for performance to take place 
and written notice of said default is sent to the offending party: 
8.3.1 should MARIN make an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, file a petition in 
bankruptcy, be adjudicated insolvent or bankrupt file a petition or apply to any 
tribunal for any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator of any substantial portion 
of its property, commence any proceeding under any law or statute of any jurisdiction 
respecting insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangement or readjustment of 
debt, dissolution, winding-up, composition or liquidation, or otherwise take advantage 
of any bankruptcy or insolvency legislation whethejr now or hereafter in effect, or if 
any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator df any substantial portion of its 
property is appointed; 
S 3 2 should MARIN be incapable of signing new Distributor/Leaders or attaining the 
volume by the dates set out in the Duties and Responsibilities section; or 
83.3 should MARIN intentionally violate any of the provisions of this agreement 
8.4 The occurrence of any one or more of the following events shall entitle MARIN to terminate fh,,<? 
Agreement (i) without further notice to Company where the default raised cannot possibly be 
cured and (ii) within ten (10) business days of the receipt of Written notice of such event where 
the default in question may be cured: 
$>AA should the Company make an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, file a petition 
in bankruptcy, be adjudicated insolvent or bankrupt, file a petition or apply to any 
tribunal for any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator of any substantial portion 
of its property, commence any proceeding under any law or statute of any jurisdiction 
respecting insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangement or readjustment of 
debt^  dissolution, winding-up, composition or liquidation, or otherwise take advantage 
of any bankruptcy or insolvency legislation whether now or hereafter in effect, or if 
any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator of any substantial portion of its 
property is appointed; 
8.4.2 should the Company cease business operations for any reason for a period of more 
than sixty (60) days in any Contract Year or for |a period of thirty (30) or more 
consecutive days; 
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8.4.3 should the Company fail to make two (2) or more payments as set out in the payment 
schedule; or 
8.4.4 should the Company fail to pay when due any other amount due to MARIN hereunder 
and fail to remedy such default within fourteen (14) days following receipt of written 
notice thereof; 
8.5 No person acting for the benefit of the creditors of either party or any receiver, trustee, liquidator, 
sequestrator, trustee in bankruptcy, sheriff, officer of a court or person in possession of either 
parry's assets or business shall have any right to continue the performance of this Agreement in 
any circumstances whatsoever. 
9. Notices. 
All notices required under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be sent to the Parties by 
United States Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requesxed, postage prepaid to the addresses first 
written above. 
10. No Agency. 
This Agreement does not constitute a joint venture, partnership or employment relationship of any 
kind between MARIN and Company. MARTN shall at all times be considered an independent 
contractor of Company as to the duties and responsibilities contemplated hereunder. As such, 
MARTN agrees that during the term of this agreement, it will be responsible for paying any amounts 
attributed to any compensation paid to MARIN to any and all taxing authorities as required by law. 
11- Assignment. 
Company may assign and transfer this Agreement, or all or an)' part of its rights as provided herein 
to any person, firm or corporation, without limitation, and this Agreement shall be binding on and 
inure to the benefit of the parties and their successors, representatives and assigns. 
Similarly, the Parties acknowledge that this is a personal services contract and understand mat 
MARIN and this contract cannot be assigned by MARIN, The parties do acknowledge that MARIN 
may personally perform the duties and responsibilities pursuant to the contract under the auspices of 
a legal entity. 
12. Waiver. 
A waiver by either party to perform or enforce any term or condition of this Agreement in any 
instance shall not be deemed or construed to be a waiver of the continuing validity or enforceability 
of such term or condition. 
13. Authority. 
The Parties represent that they have full capacity and authority to grant all rights and assume all 
obligations they have granted and assumed under this Agreement. 
14. Severability. 
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Any portion of tin's Agreement which may be prohibited or unenforceable in any applicable 
jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the exteclt of such prohibition or 
unenforceability, but shall not invalidate the remaining portions of'such provisions or the other 
provisions hereof or affect any such provisions or portion thereof'^ any other jurisdiction. 
3-5. Captions. 
The headings of the sections in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference and 
are not inxended and shall not be deemed for any purpose whatsoever to modify or explain or place 
constriction upon any of the provisions of this Agreement 
16. Governing Law. 
The Parties hereto agree that this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah 
without regard to the conflicts of law principles. The Parties further! agree that exclusive jurisdiction 
and venue to enforce this Agreement shall be in a state or federal ccjwrt of appropriate jurisdiction in 
Utah. 
17. Counterparts. 
This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed an 
original but all of which together will constitute one and the same djocument. 
38- Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto pertaining to the subject 
matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the 
Parties, and there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in 
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein. No supplement, 
modification, amendment, waiver or termination of this Agreement Ishall be binding unless executed 
in writing and signed by the Parties hereto. This Agreement does not supersede, modify or affect 
die Distributor Agreement or the Policies and Procedures and MARJIN wij] be bound separately by 
thos« agreements. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Agreement on the date first written 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Westlaw* 
876N.E.2d637 
172 Ohio App.3d 609, 876 N.E.2d 637, 2007 -Ohio- 3823 
(Cite as: 172 Ohio App.3d 609, 876 N.E.2d 637) 
Page 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, 
Sixth District, Ottawa County. 
UNITED STATES CONSTRUCTION CORPORA-
TION et al., Appellants, 
v. 
HARBOR BAY ESTATES, LTD. et al., Appellee. 
No. OT-06-019. 
Decided July 27, 2007. 
Background: Developer brought action against ad-
joining landowner for breach of contract, breach of 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresenta-
tion, and implied easement after landowner failed 
to connect contiguous water and sewer utilities into 
developer's residential development and dedicate 
such to county within 60 days. Landowner filed 
counterclaim for breach of contract, breach of cov-
enant of good faith, and a claim based on assign-
ment of the easement to development, asserting that 
development materially breached easement agree-
ment by failing to tender $45,000 due in compensa-
tion for the easement. The Court of Common Pleas, 
Ottawa County, No. 04-CVH-005, granted 
landowner's motion for a directed verdict and gran-
ted partial summary judgment to landowner on 
counterclaim. Developer appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Osowik, J., held 
that: 
(1) letter containing a 60-day time frame was inad-
missible; 
(2) landowner performed contractual duties within 
a reasonable time as required by agreement; and 
(3) landowner performed its obligations under ease-
ment agreement such that developer breached the 
agreement when it failed to tender $45,000 to 
landowner. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
|1] Evidence 157 ©=?417(19) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157X1(A|) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157kf 17 Matters Not Included in Writing 
or for Which It Does Not Provide 
J57k417(19) k. Duration of Contract 
and Time for Performance. Most Cited Cases 
Easement contact between developer and adjacent 
landowner was a clear, unambiguous, and complete 
representation of their intent such that letter con-
taining a 60-day time frame was inadmissible in 
breach of contract action by application of the doc-
trine of contract merger and the parol-evidence 
rule, although agreement did not contain a time 
frame; agreement indicated that landowner granted 
developer an easement to allow developer to con-
repair, replace, relocate, and oper-
and facilities for the purpose of ob-
taining utility service and indicated that developer 
agreed to pay $45,000 on completion of construc-
tion, installation, and tapping of the utilities, and 
agreement contained a merger clause stating it con-
stituted the complete agreement of the parties. 
|2| Evidence W €^397(1) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parbl or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157X1(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k3^7 Contracts in General 
137k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The parol evidence rule states that absent fraud, 
mistake or otheif invalidating cause, the parties' fi-
nal written integration of their agreement may not 
be varied, contradicted or supplemented by evid-
ence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, 
or prior written Agreements. 
struct, maintain 
ate utility lines 
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[3J Evidence 157 €^>397(1) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
I57k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The parol evidence rule prevents a party from intro-
ducing extrinsic evidence of negotiations that oc-
curred before or while the agreement was being re-
duced to its final form. 
|4| Evidence 157 €^>397(1) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
157k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Parol evidence is generally not admissible to con-
tradict or vary the terms of an unambiguous written 
contract. 
[5| Contracts 95 €^175(1) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 175 Evidence to Aid Construction 
95k 175(1) k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
Courts will generally presume that the intent of the 
parties to a contract resides in the language they 
chose to employ in the agreement. 
[6] Contracts 95 €^>212(2) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(D) Place and Time 
95k212 Reasonable Time 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
95k212(2) k. Time for Performance 
Where No Time Is Specified. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence 157 €^>417(19) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
l.57XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
] 57k417 Matters Not Included in Writing 
or for Which It Does Not Provide 
J57k417(19) k. Duration of Contract 
and Time for Performance. Most Cited Cases 
Where no time of performance is specified in a con-
tract, the legal effect is that it is to be performed 
within a reasonable time and parol evidence is not 
admissible to show an agreement that it shall be 
performed at a particular time. 
[7] Contracts 95 €^>213(1) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(D) Place and Time 
95k213 Time of Performance 
95k213(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Easements 141 €^>38 
141 Easements 
14 MI Extent of Right, Use, and Obstruction 
141 k38 k. Relation Between Owners of 
Dominant and Servient Tenements in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Adjacent landowner performed contractual duties 
of construction, installation, and tapping of utilities 
within a reasonable time as required under agree-
ment with developer that granted developer a utility 
easement for its development, although landowner 
did not connect contiguous water and sewer utilities 
into the development and dedicate such county 
within 60 days of the agreement; contract did not 
indicate that time was of the essence or contain any 
time frame for performance, and landowner did not 
to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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intentionally refuse to file the dedication to sup-
press the sales and development. 
i8| Contracts 95 €^>211 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(D) Place and Time 
95k211 k. Time as of the Essence of the 
Contract. Most Cited Cases 
The general rule as to contracts is that the time of 
performance is not of the essence unless the parties 
have included an express stipulation to that effect 
or such a requirement can be implied from the 
nature or circumstances of the contract. 
[9| Contracts 95 €^212(1) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(D) Place and Time 
95k2J 2 Reasonable Time 
95k212(J) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Reasonable time for a contract's performance is not 
measured by hours, days, weeks, months or years, 
but is to be determined from the surrounding condi-
tions and circumstances which the parties contem-
plated at the time the contract was executed. 
[10] Contracts 95 €=^168 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 168 k. Terms Implied as Part of Con-
tract. Most Cited Cases 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot be used to make an end run around the parol 
evidence rule. 
[Ill Easements 141 €^>38 
141 Easements 
14 III Extent of Right, Use, and Obstruction 
141 k38 k. Relation Between Owners of 
Dominant and Servient Tenements in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Adjacent landowner performed its obligations un-
der easement agreement with developer when de-
veloper succeeded in tapping the utilities on the 
easement property, and thus developer breached the 
agreement whqn it failed to tender $45,000 to 
landowner as required under the agreement. 
[12] Contracts 95 €>^>326 
95 Contracts 
95VI Action^ for Breach 
95k32fi k. Grounds of Action. Most Cited 
Cases 
Breach of contract occurs when a party demon-
strates the existence of a binding contract or agree-
ment, the nonbreaching party performed its contrac-
tual obligations^ the other party failed to fulfill its 
contractual obligations without legal excuse, and 
the nonbreaching party suffered damages as a result 
of the breach. 
**638 John E. B|reen, for appellants. 
Erik G. Chappell, Toledo, for appellee. 
OSOWIK, Judge;. 
*612 (TI 1} Thi& is an appeal from a judgment of 
the Ottawa County Common Pleas Court, which 
granted a motion for directed verdict in favor of ap-
pellee, Harbor Bay Estates, Ltd. The trial court dis-
missed all clainjs filed by appellants and granted 
partial summary! judgment in favor of appellee on 
his counterclaim in the amount of $45,000. For the 
reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judg-
ment of the trial pourt. 
**639 {^[ 2} The| following undisputed facts are rel-
evant to the issues raised on appeal. Appellant 
United States Construction Corporation ("USCC") 
is a Florida corporation registered in Ohio as a real-
estate-development company. In December 1999, 
USCC acquired a|n undeveloped tract of land in Ott-
awa County, Ohio. This property did not contain 
utility service. 
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{H 3} On July 31, 2003, USCC transferred this land 
to appellant The Cove on the Bay L.L.C. ("The 
Cove"). This land was developed into The Cove, a 
residential development. Greg Spatz is the sole 
principal of both entities. 
{U 4} Appellee, Harbor Bay, is an Ohio limited-li-
ability company that engages in residential devel-
opment. Its land is contiguous to appellants' land. 
Scott Prephan is the principal of Harbor Bay. 
{H 5} In May 2003, USCC began to develop The 
Cove. The principal, Spatz, negotiated with Pre-
phan to obtain an easement over Harbor Bay. In 
June 2003, Harbor Bay entered into an easement 
agreement with USCC. Pursuant to the agreement, 
Harbor Bay granted USCC a 30-foot-wide utility 
easement ("the easement property"). The grant of 
easement provided: 
{H 6} "Grantor grants and conveys to Grantee, its 
successors and assigns, a non-exclusive, perpetual 
easement in, over, across, and under the Easement 
Property for the benefit of Grantee and Grantee's 
Property for the purpose of constructing, maintain-
ing, repairing, replacing, relocating, and operating 
utility lines and facilities, as defined later in this 
paragraph 2, for the distribution of water and sew-
erage, together with the right to construct lines, 
pump valves, and lift stations, and all other neces-
sary equipment and appurtenances solely in accord-
ance with plans and specifications reviewed and ap-
proved by the Ottawa County, Sanitary Engineering 
Department ('the Utilities'); provided, however, 
*613 that all the Utilities shall be connected under-
ground. Grantor shall retain the right to use any sur-
face area of the Easement Property for purposes 
that are consistent with the grant of the easement 
herein. Grantee shall not exercise its rights with re-
spect to the Easement Property to the exclusion of 
the Grantor or to such an extent that it will have the 
effect of unreasonably interfering with the Grantor's 
rights in the Easement Property." 
{H 7} In exchange for the easement rights, Harbor 
Bay was to receive sizable financial consideration. 
Page 4 
Specifically, Paragraph 3 of the agreement provides 
that the "Grantee shall pay Grantor the sum of 
Forty-Five Thousand Dollars on completion of 
Grantor's construction, installation, and tapping of 
the Utilities." 
{H 8} On January 3, 2004, appellants initiated this 
lawsuit against Harbor Bay and set forth claims of 
breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, misrepresentation, and implied ease-
ment. It was appellants' contention that appellee 
breached the agreement by failing to connect con-
tiguous water and sewer utilities into appellants' 
residential development and dedicate such to Ott-
awa County within 60 days. 
{U 9} Harbor Bay claimed that it had performed its 
obligations under the agreement by allowing The 
Cove to construct and install a tap to the utilities on 
the easement property. In his trial testimony, Pre-
phan asserted that the agreement between Harbor 
Bay and USCC did not contain a time of perform-
ance or require Harbor Bay to file its plot plan or 
dedicate its utilities to Ottawa County at a specific 
time. 
{U 10} Harbor Bay filed counterclaims against ap-
pellants. The counterclaims asserted**640 breach 
of contract, breach of covenant of good faith, and a 
claim based on USCC's assignment of the easement 
to The Cove. It was asserted that The Cove materi-
ally breached the agreement by failing to tender 
$45,000 due in compensation for the easement. 
{H 11} The fact that the agreement is silent as to the 
time of performance is not disputed. However, ap-
pellants assert that pursuant to negotiations between 
the parties, Harbor Bay had a duty to extend water 
and sewer lines to the property line of The Cove 
and to ensure dedication of the utilities within a 
reasonable time. In his trial testimony, Spatz indic-
ated that a letter prepared by him, dated June 5, 
2006, and sent to Prephan, without objection to its 
terms, manifests the intention of a 60-day time 
frame. He further contends that the agreed sum of 
$45,000 was to ensure that the construction process 
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was expedited and dedication of the utilities was 
completed within this time frame. 
(H 12} On September 9, 2005, Harbor Bay filed a 
motion for summary judgment and sought dismissal 
of all claims against it asserted by appellants and 
judgment in the amount of $45,000 on its counter-
claim. 
*614 fl[ 13} On November 28, 2005, this matter 
was heard before the Ottawa County Common 
Pleas Court. At the close of appellants' case, the tri-
al court rendered an oral decision and granted a dir-
ected verdict in favor of Harbor Bay. This decision 
was formalized on February 17, 2006. 
{H 14} On February 21, 2006, the trial court gran-
ted Harbor Bay partial summary judgment on its 
counterclaim for a judgment against USCC, in the 
amount of $45,000, interests, and costs. On May 
18, 2006, the trial court dismissed without preju-
dice all remaining counterclaims asserted by Har-
bor Bay. 
fl| 15} On June 14, 2006, appellants filed a timely 
notice of appeal and set forth the following three 
assignments of error: 
{U 16} "A. The lower court erred to the prejudice of 
appellant U.S. Construction when it granted a direc-
ted verdict by failing to properly identify a reason-
able time for performance under the contract 
between the parties. 
{U 17} "B. The lower court erred, as a matter of 
law, when it granted a directed verdict against ap-
pellant but failed to consider parol evidence regard-
ing the time of performance under the contract 
between the parties that was embodied in a written 
letter issued one week prior thereto. 
{H 18} "C. The lower court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment against appellant U.S. Construction 
on Appellee's claim for payment of $45,000.00 un-
der the contract." 
{U 19} There are two preliminary issues we must 
address before we can proceed to the merits of ap-
pellants' arguments. First, analyzing the assign-
ments in the ojrder presented by appellants is not 
conducive to our analysis. Our judgment on appel-
lants' second assignment of error is determinative 
of the validity j)f appellants' first assignment of er-
ror. Accordingly, we will address these assignments 
of error in reverse order and then proceed to the 
third. Second, in their first and second assignments 
of error, appel ants challenge the trial court's de-
cision granting a directed verdict in favor of Harbor 
Bay. A motion for directed verdict pursuant to a 
Civ.R. 50 is not the applicable standard in a non-
jury trial. Tewarson v. Simon (2001), 141 Ohio 
App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176; Ramco Special-
ties, Inc. v. Pansegraii (1998), 134 Ohio App.3d 
513,520,731 N.E.2d714. 
{K 20} It is well established that in a bench trial, the 
proper motion fpr judgment**641 at the conclusion 
of a plaintiffs! case is one for dismissal under 
Civ.R. 41(B)(2). Harris v. Cincinnati (1992). 79 
Ohio App.3d 163, 607 N.E.2d 15; Janell, Inc. v. 
Woods (1980), 70 Ohio App.2d 216, 24 0.0.3d 
266, 435 N.E|2d 1138; Altimari v. Campbell 
(1978), 56 Ohij App.2d 253, 10 0.0.3d 268, 382 
N.E.2d 1187; *K\SJacobs v. 3d. of Cty. Commrs. 
(1971), 27 Ohij> App.2d 63, 56 0.0.2d 245, 272 
N.E.2d 635. Thus, we will construe it as one for in-
voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2). 
{H 21} In ruling on a motion for involuntary dis-
missal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2), the trial court weighs 
the evidence and resolves any conflict therein, and 
it may render judgment in favor of the defendant if 
the plaintiff hai shown no right to relief. Ramco 
Specialties, Inc\, 134 Ohio App.3d at 520, 731 
N.E.2d 714. Uppn review, a trial court's judgment 
should not be reversed unless erroneous as a matter 
of law or against the manifest weight of the evid-
ence. 
{K 22} Therefore, if the record contains competent, 
credible evidence supporting the findings of fact 
and conclusions! of law rendered by the trial court 
judge, this judgment will not be set aside. CE. 
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Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio 
St.2d 279, 8 0.0.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578. 
[1] (U 23} In their second assignment of error, ap-
pellants assert that the trial court erred when it 
failed to consider parol evidence regarding the time 
of performance under the contract between the 
parties that was embodied in a written letter issued 
one week prior to the contact. 
{K 24} The trial court found that the utility agree-
ment was unambiguous and that introduction of the 
June 5, 2003 letter would contradict the terms in it. 
It stated that pursuant to the doctrine of contract 
merger, 'The parties cannot rely on prior state-
ments or agreements to supplement the written 
agreement without varying its terms." Accordingly, 
the trial court held that parol evidence cannot be 
used to contradict the language of the contract. 
[2] {U 25} We concur with the trial court. The parol 
evidence rule states that "absent fraud, mistake or 
other invalidating cause, the parties' final written 
integration of their agreement may not be varied, 
contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior 
or contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior writ-
ten agreements." Galmish v. Cicchini (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 22, 27, 734 N.E.2d 782, quoting 11 Wil-
liston on Contracts (4 Ed. 1999) 569-570, Section 
33:4. 
[3][4] {H 26} This is a common-law principle that 
operates to prevent a party from introducing ex-
trinsic evidence of negotiations that occurred before 
or while the agreement was being reduced to its fi-
nal form. Bellman v. Am. Internatl. Group, 163 
Ohio App.3d 540, 2005-Ohio-5250, 839 N.E.2d 
430, % 7; Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Soc. Natl. Bank 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 440, 662 N.E.2d 1074. 
As such, parol evidence is generally not admissible 
to contradict or vary the terms of an unambiguous 
written contract. Id. 
[5][6] {H 27} Appellants argue that the June 5, 2003 
letter, containing a 60-day time limit, should be 
considered to explain the parties' intent and the 
Page 6 
terms of the agreement. They contend that since the 
letter does not add to, vary, or *616 contradict the 
terms of the contract, it is not barred by the parol-
evidence rule. However, courts will "[generally * * 
* presume that the intent of the parties to a contract 
resides in the language they chose to employ in the 
agreement." Shifrin v. Forest Enis., Inc. (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 635, 638, 597 N.E.2d 499; **642Kelfy 
v. Med. Life Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 
132, 31 OBR 289, 509 N.E.2d 411. Furthermore, 
when no time of performance is specified in a con-
tract, the legal effect is that it is to be performed 
within a reasonable time and "parol evidence is not 
admissible to show an agreement that it shall be 
performed at a particular time." Buschmeyer v. Ad-
vance Mach. Co. (1916), 7 Ohio App. 202, 216. 
{H 28} The doctrine of contract merger, a corollary 
to the parol-evidence rule, further weakens appel-
lants' argument. In TRINOVA Corp. v. Pilkington 
Bros., P.LC (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 271, 638 
N.E.2d 572, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: 
"Contract integration provides that where the 
parties' intent is sought to be ascertained from sev-
eral writings, a prior writing will be rejected in fa-
vor of a subsequent one if the latter writing con-
tains the whole of the parties' agreement. If the sub-
sequent agreement is complete and unambiguous on 
its face, parol evidence is inadmissible to show a 
contrary intent of the parties." 
{U 29} In the case at bar, Paragraph 8 of the utility 
agreement provides: "This agreement contains the 
entire agreement of the parties. This agreement 
shall not be amended, changed or modified or any 
provision waived or discharged, in whole or in part, 
unless that agreement is in writing and duly signed 
by the parties hereto." 
{H 30} Thus, by signing the agreement, it is pre-
sumed that appellants incorporated all prior negoti-
ations and agreements into the final agreement and 
that the final agreement represents the intent and 
full agreement between the parties. Fontbank, Inc. 
v. CompuServe, Inc. (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 801, 
808, 742 N.E.2d 674; Figetakis v. Smith (Mar. 4, 
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1998), 9th Dist. No. 18393, 1998 WL 114473; Natl. 
City Bank v. Donaldson (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 
241,245, 642 N.E.2d 58. 
{H 31} The clear language of the agreement indic-
ates that Harbor Bay granted USCC an easement to 
allow appellants to construct, maintain, repair, re-
place, relocate, and operate utility lines and facilit-
ies for the purpose of obtaining utility service on 
their property. It is also clear that USCC agreed to 
pay Harbor Bay the sum of $45,000 on completion 
of construction, installation, and tapping of the util-
ities. This agreement does not provide a time for 
performance or include a reference to a timeframe 
for dedication of the utilities to Ottawa County. 
H 32} We acknowledge that the June 5, 2003 letter 
provides a time for performance. However, it pred-
ates the formalized agreement and the record shows 
that appellants had an attorney, had time to review 
the agreement, and had the opportunity to bargain 
for its terms. Therefore, the agreement is a *617 
clear, unambiguous, and complete representation of 
the parties' intent, and parol evidence is inadmiss-
ible to contradict its terms. 
{\ 33} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did 
not err in holding that the proposed letter was inad-
missible by application of the doctrine of contract 
merger and the parol-evidence rule. This decision 
and subsequent grant of dismissal in favor of Har-
bor Bay was not against the manifest weight of 
evidence or contrary to law. Accordingly, appel-
lants' second assignment of error is not well taken. 
[7] {^ | 34} In their first assignment of error, appel-
lants contend that the trial court erred to the preju-
dice of USCC when it failed to identify a reason-
able time for performance under the contract and 
granted a directed verdict in favor of Harbor Bay. 
H 35} Under this assignment of error, appellants 
assert two arguments. First, they contend that the 
sole intent of agreement**643 between the parties 
was to expedite the construction process and ensure 
water service to USCC's property on a timely basis. 
They propose tr^at 60 days is a reasonable time and 
that the construction, development, and sale of ap-
pellants' property could not have been established 
without it. 
{\ 36} Second,Iappellants contend that Harbor Bay 
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by 
refusing to work with USCC to effectuate the pur-
pose of their agreement. Appellants argue that Har-
bor Bay intentionally refused to file the dedication 
for almost seven months to suppress the sales and 
development off USCC's property and to extort ad-
ditional concessions from USCC before it would 
file. 
{\ 37} The tri^l court held that since the 60-day 
time period is not part of the written agreement 
between the parties, appellants' entire case fails. We 
agree. 
[8] {\ 38} The! general rule as to contracts is that 
the time of performance is not of the essence unless 
the parties have; included an express stipulation to 
that effect or such a requirement can be implied 
from the nature or circumstances of the contract. 
Brown v. Brown (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 781, 784, 
630N.E.2d763i 
[9] {^1 39} "Reasonable time for a contract's per-
formance is not measured by hours, days, weeks, 
months or year$, but is to be determined from the 
surrounding conditions and circumstances which 
the parties contemplated at the time the contract 
was executed." Miller v. Bealer (1992), 80 Ohio 
App.3d 180, 182, 608 N.E.2d 1133. 
{K 40} It is undisputed that this contract involved a 
grant of a utility easement for the development of 
real property. The record indicates that all parties 
had full knowledge of this fact. However, the 
agreement at is$ue does not indicate *618 that time 
is of the essence. If time was of the essence, it 
should have beein made an essential part of the con-
tract terms. 
{H 41} Additionally, the record does not indicate 
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that Harbor Bay failed to perform within a reason-
able time or that it intentionally refused to file the 
dedication to suppress the sales and development of 
USCC's property. On the contrary, according to the 
trial testimony of Spatz, the construction, installa-
tion, and tapping of the utilities was completed on 
or before July 1,2003. 
[10] {1| 42} Having held above that the trial court 
did not err in finding that the letter indicating a 
60-day time limit was inadmissible, there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that Harbor Bay failed to 
perform its obligation as set forth in the clear lan-
guage of the agreement. Furthermore, "[t]he im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot 
be used to make an end run around the parol evid-
ence rule." McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., 8th 
Dist. No. 79025, 2002-Ohio-7220, 2002 WL 
31875200, f 24. Accordingly, appellants' first as-
signment of error is not well taken. 
[11] (K 43} In appellants' third assignment of error, 
they assert that the lower court erred in granting 
summary judgment against USCC on Harbor Bay's 
claim for payment of $45,000 under the contract. 
fl[ 44} In review of a trial court's summary-judg-
ment decision, this court employs a de novo stand-
ard of review, applying the same standard used as 
the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts. 
(1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198; 
Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 
102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Summary judgment will 
be granted when there remains no genuine issue of 
material fact and, when construing the evidence 
most strongly in favor of the nonmoving**644 
party, reasonable minds can come to but one con-
clusion, that being that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C). 
{\ 45} Appellants argue that this case should not 
have been taken away from the jury's consideration 
pertaining to the allegations of breach of contract 
arguably still under dispute. 
[12] {^  46} Breach of contract occurs when "a 
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party demonstrates the existence of a binding con-
tract or agreement; the nonbreaching party per-
formed its contractual obligations; the other party 
failed to fulfill its contractual obligations without 
legal excuse; and the nonbreaching party suffered 
damages as a result of the breach." Lawrence v. Lo-
rain Cty. Community College (1998), 127 Ohio 
App.3d 546, 549, 713 N.E.2d 478; Circuit Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Mueller Elec. Co., 9th Dist. No. 
05-CA-008775, 2006-Ohio-4321, 2006 WL 
2390269, % 7. 
*619 {lj 47} In order for appellants to prevail in 
their argument, they would need to show that Har-
bor Bay failed to perform its contractual obligations 
without legal excuse. The trial court held that for 
the reasons clearly set forth and well articulated in 
defendant's memorandum, "Defendant is entitled to 
judgment against Plaintiff on its counterclaim in the 
amount of $45,000.00, interest and costs." This de-
cision was based on the finding that Harbor Bay 
had performed the terms of the agreement. 
{H 48} We concur with the trial court's determina-
tion. Appellants failed to sustain the argument of a 
60-day time limit. Appellants cannot show that 
Harbor Bay breached the agreement. As such, Har-
bor Bay performed its obligations under the agree-
ment when appellants succeeded in tapping the util-
ities on the easement property. Therefore, appel-
lants breached the agreement when it failed to 
tender $45,000. 
{^1 49} Accordingly, there is no issue of fact to be 
determined. Appellants' third assignment of error is 
not well taken. 
{% 50} On consideration whereof, the judgment of 
the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is af-
firmed. Appellants are ordered to pay costs of this 
appeal pursuant to App.R.24. Judgment for the 
clerk's expense incurred in preparation of the re-
cord, fees allowed by law, and the fee for filing the 
appeal is awarded to Ottawa County. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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HANDWORK and PIETRYKOWSKI, JJ., concur. 
OhioApp. 6Dist.,2007. 
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